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1.1. The Aim, Structure and Object of the Study 
The present doctoral dissertation is an exercise in exposition, comparison, criti-
cism and construction, and this is the result of a project conceived ten years ago. 
We have taken different traditions of legal reasoning, and by juxtaposing them 
have sought to clarify and assess semiotic presuppositions, in order to outline a 
theoretical framework of legal semiotics that would help to lay the foundations 
for semiotic theory of legal argumentation. These semiotic presuppositions have 
been the object of our study at the University of Tartu since our bachelor’s the-
sis (defended in 2001) and master’s thesis (defended in 2006). Our interest in 
legal semiotics was motivated by a very strong sense of dissatisfaction with the 
traditional methods and paradigms of contemporary jurisprudence, especially 
with those ones of legal argumentation. Traditional jurisprudence committed to 
a model of legal unity, does not for the most part seeks to describe how the 
views of legal actors interact with the views of other legal actors/participants of 
legal discourse in real situations of legal communication. Thus, it was the con-
sideration of legal communication as a semiotic activity that caused us to doubt 
that law could be conceived in terms of traditional legal concepts. Legal semiot-
ics can be regarded as a major advance because it debunks the prevailing as-
sumptions about the nature of legal reasoning and replaces them with what 
seems a far superior explanation. 
The main scientific objectives of this dissertation can be briefly formulated 
as follows:  
 
1) to develop a conceptual framework for practical handling of complex 
problems of legal argumentation as they occur in the stages of legal 
communication; 
2) to assess issues of compatibility/conflict between existing methods of 
legal reasoning and our semiotic model of legal reasoning;  
3) to bridge the compatible aspects of different theories/models of legal 
argumentation to establish a generalizable model of legal argumenta-
tion. 
The first and foremost aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the develop-
ment of an overall semiotic theory of legal reasoning with a special focus on the 
theoretical concept of conflict. In other words, our main ambition is to resusci-
tate traditional theories of legal argumentation by developing a less formal theo-
ry of legal argumentation. Before explaining the structure of this dissertation 
and mapping the issues, we would like to mention here that our critical analysis 
of legal argumentation may appear surprising and unusual to many legal schol-
ars and semioticians. Since the main objective of this dissertation to bridge the 
gap between traditional legal theories and different semiotic theories of law, in 
our dissertation we tend to focus on the concept of conflict, which is the reason 
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for privileging the semiotic concept of tension. At first sight it seems strange if 
not confusing to claim that ‘tension’ is a key component of a semiotically sensi-
tive theory of legal reasoning. Inevitably the problem of conflict/‘tension’ con-
stitutes an important point in any theoretical attempt to integrate semiotic theo-
ries (structural semiotics of law, Peircean semiotics of law and the semiotics of 
the Tartu-Moscow School). From one of the basic premises of the semiotics of 
culture, it is understood that the more complex the semiosphere is; the more 
complex is its ‘interpretation’. Due to semiotic ‘tension’ (‘conflict’) between 
different languages of cultures, the inner ‘tension’ between competing lan-
guages can be slowed down when ‘self-description’ or the development of a 
meta-language takes place (Lotman 1990:128). What is important now is to 
clarify the potential of ‘tension’ proper to legal argumentation, to see to what 
extent it supports the methodological establishment of a semiotics of legal ar-
gumentation. That much said, it is obvious the nature of reasoning in legal ar-
gumentation brings together many underlying ‘parts’ problems and concerns 
with the basic concept of an argument into very complex unity (which we might 
call a semiosphere, since it is a unity that masks semiotic conflicts that co-exist 
within this unity). If one will abandon the myth of a uniform unity of culture, 
and looks separately at the various semiotic groups operative within this unity 
(semiosphere), then the ‘semiotic conflict’ between the parts and the whole in 
the semiosphere would appear as an inherent component in modern cultural 
processes that bring into play the conflict among different universes of values 
and beliefs. The existence of such groups would emphasize both the tension 
between comprehension-incomprehension and the question of identity-making 
of subjects (Geninasca 1997). 
The dissertation is divided into five chapters, and the significant part of 
Chapters 2 and 3 is committed to critical reflection upon the work of other 
scholars. In Chapter 2, we first introduce the reader to the main topic of this 
dissertation by providing a brief discussion of different methods of juridical 
interpretation and reasoning and by putting the content of this thesis into the 
comparative interdisciplinary context suitable for analysing empirical material. 
However, to consider the field of legal argumentation/reasoning in all its 
complexity is to contemplate a huge chunk of the modern analytical juris-
prudence. No attempt is here made to survey the whole filed of legal argu-
mentation, because the technical and methodological limitations of our thesis 
does not allow to include all (otherwise) necessary information for under-
standing the theoretical background of different approaches to the topic of legal 
argumentation. Rather, Chapter 2 seeks to juxtapose the most critical central 
issues in different theories of legal argumentation with consideration derived 
from semiotics. Also, for the sake of simplicity, in order to meet the estimated 
expectations of the readers we will disregard some complicated methods, in 
which one interpretative technique is inseparable from another. Instead, we will 
focus on traditional pure techniques of interpretation: some of those techniques 
are based on either subjective or objective criteria, while another group repre-
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sents the combination of rigorous approaches, such as ‘intentionalism’, ‘textual-
ism’, ‘originalism’, ‘interpretivism’ and ‘indeterminism’.  
In a further section that follows (Chapter 2.1), we explicitly formulate the 
main research questions to be addressed in this dissertation. It is worth noting 
that the questions underlying problematic aspects of legal argumentation, and 
not merely the variety of answers offered to those questions raise many semiotic 
issues. The first question asks whether the problem of ‘conflict’ is definable in 
terms of semiotics, as a tension between different methods of legal argumenta-
tion. If the question posed in respect of the concept of conflict is theoretical, the 
second question is highly practical: what kind of a legal discourse (doctrines, 
approaches, methods) is most suitable for encapsulating semiotic accounts of 
conflict? 
In Chapter 3 we try to explicate important aspects of conflict in law. In doing 
so, we are going to interpolate the concept of conflict into legal discourse, 
where we can fully appreciate what is really meant by the concept of conflict in 
legal theory and practice. In describing conflict as a tension, conflict cannot be 
taken to mean that it lacks other connotations, notwithstanding that a different 
meaning may be attached to it by hermeneutics or phenomenology. Therefore, 
our semiotic analysis of legal argumentation is aided by other non-semiotic 
theories whose application contributes to our understanding of conflict in law. 
For example, in order to substantiate our claim in regards of important role 
played by conflict in legal discourses, we have taken the interdisciplinary sup-
port from the comprehensive range of theories (from the jurisprudential doctrine 
of Conflict of Laws to hermeneutics, phenomenology and deconstruction), since 
the implementation of those theories in the modern studies of legal argumenta-
tion has given an impetus to the emergence of very sophisticated interpretative 
styles handed down by scholars and practitioners alike. We should, however, 
mention that despite its attractiveness, our interdisciplinary approach can pose a 
methodological danger for imposing preconceived semiotic considerations on 
different considerations of interpretation in different approaches. Indeed, a 
scholar, who is entitled to pursue down further comparative distinction between 
those different approaches, will ultimately find himself caught in a debate that 
touches on the disagreements about which approaches explain best interpreta-
tion in different contexts. As noted earlier it is imperative that in order to recog-
nize the resemblance between different methods of interpretation and bind them 
together for purposes of useful discussion, we must access their merits under a 
magnifying glass of more general hermeneutic, deconstructionist, and semiotic 
accounts of conflict in law. For this dissertation, it is no small task to bring 
those accounts together, because in doing so one needs to overcome the obvious 
discrepancies between different methods of legal interpretation. Proceeding 
from the theoretical premises of previous sections, we try to distinguish some of 
the most theoretical underpinnings of traditional legal, phenomenological, her-
meneutic and deconstructionist approaches. We then turn to a general character-
ization of the conflict: the conferment on conflict of the special status does not 
in itself mean that it is the forestalling of conflict by legislation that establishes 
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common rules of interpretation. Rather, in our analysis, conflict comes to be 
viewed as an inevitable product of semio-cultural processes within the legal 
system. 
Chapter 4 includes summaries of five relevant papers written on the topic of 
thesis (articles are included into the appendix of this thesis). As these articles 
have been written and/or published over last three years, it would be possible to 
gain insights from reading these texts into the last phase of evolution of our 
doctoral research project. Three of those papers have been previously published 
in peer-reviewed journals and two are accepted for publications. Although all of 
them are based on the core topics of my doctoral research, it is the value of this 
dissertation that it brings together all the disparate publications into one coher-
ent whole. The articles have been arranged chronologically based on the date of 
receipt at publication venues, from the oldest to the newest. Such a sorting logic 
seems to be very intuitive to the design of our dissertation, allowing the readers 
to trace the evolution of our research project. The complete overview of includ-
ed publications will be further discussed in Chapter 4; here we need mention 
only the mapping of issues. In Article I “Charles Sanders Peirce, A Mastermind 
of (Legal) Arguments” we tried to apply Peircean semiotics to the evaluation of 
legal arguments. Article II “On Relationships between The Logic of Law, Legal 
Positivism and Semiotics of Law” addresses essential issue of mutual relation-
ships between juridical logic, positivist science of law and legal semiotics. Arti-
cle III (“The Semiotic Model of Legal Reasoning”) is (as it follows from the 
title) a contribution to the development of the semiotic model of legal reason-
ing. Subsequently, in two last articles (Article IV “The Case of Lauris Kaplins-
ki: A Guide to A Semiotic Reading of Hatred in Modern Criminal Justice”, 
Article V “The Splendors and Miseries of Constitutional Reasoning in Times of 
Global Crisis”) we introduce practical applications of our ideas to the analysis 
of judicial cases. Finally, in short concluding Chapter 5, the two main areas in 
which we have done our doctoral research, semiotic critique of jurisprudence 
and semiotics of legal reasoning, come together when we show how the notion 
of conflict in legal argumentation can be re-conceptualized as a semiotic device. 
Here we wish to extend our model of legal argumentation to a larger range of 
competing semiotic theories, and to answer the following question in a succinct 
manner: how can theories of argumentation benefit from semiotics? Certainly, 
we may not able to reduce all activities of legal reasoning to a single semiotic 
system. But we can characterize the various methods of legal reasoning which 
claim to be valid, and we can analyse their semiotic inter-relationship. Such an 
endeavour would refine and advance existing models of legal argumentation in 
many respects.  
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2. THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF LEGAL  
INTERPRETATION AND REASONING 
2.1. The Tension Between Different Methods  
of Interpretation 
One of the implications, drawn from the adoption of Jakobson’s model of inter-
pretation (Jakobson 1987) as a basis for describing the act of interpretation, is 
the doubling of factors and functions: for example in law, the tasks of objective 
and subjective methods of legal interpretation have recently been doubled by 
assimilating the complexity of current hermeneutics. On the other hand, we 
might also propose that widely acclaimed textualist and originalist approaches 
to legal interpretation may be themselves useful in the context of constitutional 
interpretation, but they are not for interpretation of cases etc. Once again, fol-
lowing Jakobson, we also have to realize that it is the contextual properties of 
reasoning that matter most (Jakobson 1987: 66–72). One can also expect that 
the same suggestion holds true for the intentionalist theory of interpretation. 
This is also important insofar as it holds true for that account of intentional 
meaning always has the advantage over circular hermeneutic interpretation, 
which links interpreter and interpreted text, and that actual meaning of a legal 
text is found in the intention of its author.  
From this point of view, one can see interpretation as recognition of the 
meaning that its author was able to embody using a special kind of unity of 
materials,1 and the interpreter of a legal text seeks to engage with the intention 
of its author. A similar stance on interpretation was taken by Umberto Eco. He 
proposed two concepts of interpretation: on one hand, to interpret means to 
consider the ‘objective’ nature of a text (Eco 1990), its essence, and its inde-
pendence. Thus, the meaning is determined by analysing external evidence ra-
ther than the subjective or internal intention of the author or the contracting 
parties (compare for example Nerhot’s opinion that “the anticipation of mean-
ing that guides our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity”) (Nerhot 
1993: 42). Another concept gives emphasis to the subjective intention of its 
author and therefore it represents an approach, which was derived from the 
hermeneutic tradition, in which the text is viewed as something open to infinite 
‘unlimited interpretation’ (Eco 1990: 36). No explicit preferences exist between 
those two types of approaches: the legislatures, courts, and the legal academies 
of different countries of the world present considerably divergent views on the 
issue of the intent of the author in the process of interpretation, especially in the 
realm of Civil Law. For instance, in the European Union, the courts in the 
Common Law countries (the UK, Ireland) have voiced a preference for relying 
on objective manifestations of the parties’ intentions (objective method of inter-
pretation); while in other Member States (Germany, Austria, France, Italy) the 
                                                          
1  Compare, for example, Emilio, Betti. Teoria generate della interpretazione. 2 vols. 
Milan, 1955. 
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doctrine of the subjective interpretation takes precedence. In passing, we should 
also mention the more radical doctrine of legal interpretation that was devel-
oped by the Scandinavian legal scholar Alf Ross: the latter denied classical dis-
tinction between subjective and objective interpretation, because our under-
standing could vary with the interpretation of data that the recipient of text takes 
into consideration (Ross 1958). At the same time, a closer look at the state of 
traditional legal theory reveals that the various techniques of interpretation 
(used for analysis of legal texts/legal acts) are typically derived from ‘interpre-
tivism’ that while also rejecting literalist and subjectivist interpretations, as-
sumes simultaneously that the legal interpretation has to unfold the only correct 
(re)solution of any situation of legal indeterminacy. This idea is best exempli-
fied in Dworkin’s most notorious saying: there exists only one correct interpre-
tation. Contrary to Dworkin’s position, an opposite current of legal theory of 
interpretation, – so called ‘indeterminism’ – maintains that results of legal in-
terpretation are always intrinsically indeterminate: thus, the position of indeter-
minism is that any particular act of whichever legal interpretation that prevails 
at a given time amounts to policy-making (Raz 1996) or self-adjudicating refer-
encing to the authority of canon or tradition (Marmor 1996). In this context, 
crucial variations in interpretation contribute to an increase in their “tension”, 
realized through the variations in the arbitrary relationship between signifying 
and signified. Therefore to describe the tension would be to analyse the various 
interpretative operations that are brought into play by special kinds of discourse. 
The tension between mentioned types of interpretation and normativism also 
became apparent in the debate concerning the role of narrative coherence in 
legal argument (Jackson 1990: 417). Considering the function of coherence in 
interpretation, the followers of strict ‘intentionalism’ would claim that under the 
principle of symmetry in legal communication, the main objective of interpreta-
tion is to identify the intention of the author (legislature etc.,) or the contracting 
parties, and thus conflicts should be interpreted narrowly to maintain the coher-
ence of the internalized order (Marmor 2001). Unfortunately, this opinion 
spawns more problems than solutions: indeed, if a reader interprets a text, then 
an interpretation generated by a second reader with a different set of interpreta-
tive strategies must necessary conflict with the facts as the first reader intended 
to see them. A new reader creates a new text, which is understood to be a read-
er-dependent form of the original text, and thus, it would be rather impossible to 
speculate about the maintaining of coherence in conditions of hermeneutic con-
flict. This problem has its own practical complications: for example, we could 
recall some scholars pointed out that a hermeneutic conflict could easily devel-
op into either a constitutional crisis or a crisis of legal ideology, through an 
encounter with a mutual untranslatability in language, law, and culture that is 
also an encounter with surprising forms of translation of even such basic Euro-
pean legal concepts such as ‘rule of the law’ (Hutchings 1999). 
In trying to formulate semiotic quintessence of interpretation, we could (fol-
lowing Lotman 1990) argue that it is extracting information and new meanings 
from the untranslatable that increases the value of information in closed sign 
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systems. In a closed system of law, the selection of interpretation strategies 
aims at overcoming the crisis of apparent indeterminacy by subordinating one 
participant of the indeterminate or conflict situation for another. At the same 
time, a relatively open system of reasoning wants to sustain the paradoxical 
structure, since it may act in only one direction only at a time, and since that is 
all that is possible in any practical sense. In a legal system, which is understood 
here as a sign system of law it is vitally important to develop the integrating 
conditions which prevent the legal system from falling apart. In the semiotic 
conceptualization of law, at least two important questions remain to be an-
swered. To such questions, a reply could be made through Kevelson’s ideas: 
one of them is focused on the structure of paradox, i.e., the basic relationship of 
meaning that underlies legal praxis, which is regarded here, as a structure of 
conjoining of the vague and the definite. For our research here, it suffices to say 
that the model of conflict in legal reasoning advanced by Kevelson has not re-
ceived due attention in the relevant legal literature. Yet on the other hand, there 
could not be any doubt that this model would not differ in a significant manner 
from the model of process by which reason in law is related to the laws of rea-
son: the model confronts us with the violation of the law of identity, and this is 
the basic paradox examined by Chaim Perelman (Perelman 1965). Perelman 
tackled the problem by demonstrating that classical paradoxes of reasoning 
(such as the famous Paradox of the Barber) were compatible with classical strict 
logic. Perelman claimed that such paradoxes are logically legitimate ‘antino-
mies’, being derived from hypotheses that are in turn consistent with hypotheses 
that are valid in strict logic (critic), which requires alternation. Perelman held 
that a conflict of norms constitutes an abnormal situation in a system in which 
the principle of non-contradiction is essential and in which logical coherence 
constitutes a fundamental requirement (Perelman 1965: 392–395). One could 
view the methodological manoeuvring with the concept of “antinomy” in the 
analysis of legal systems as a successful attempt to criticize Kelsen’s stance on 
norm-conflict resolution, by showing that the conflict endangers the logical 
coherence of the system as a whole. To gain a critical perspective on problems 
ensuing from the acceptance of antinomy, we could regard antinomy as a final 
outcome of a power conflict between those who want to control the legal system 
in order to bring about social ideals and those who still wish to consider legal 
actors, such as judges, as ‘institutions of a spontaneous order’ (Kevelson 1981). 
In this respect, the legal system can promote a greater interaction with other 
sovereign laws, either by admitting that foreign law shall apply in cases of con-
flict of laws regulated by private international law – or by tolerating a foreign 
legal element in its jurisdiction. A good illustrating example of tolerating a for-
eign element in a legal system is a rule in a foreign system of law, which differs 
from the rules of public international law in this respect that domestic courts 
will not usually take judicial notice of this rule, and by virtue of this fact, rules 
of foreign law generally have the status of facts. It is precisely this awareness of 
a basic antinomy (pertaining to the nature of legal reasoning in private interna-
tional law) that lead us toward the solutions of some problems in modern legal 
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theories/doctrines – the problems, which are perhaps easier to dramatize in the 
realm of so called ‘Conflict of Laws’. 
Before proceeding to the discussion of Conflict of Laws, we must to narrow 
down the scope of terms used therein. According to the narrow formulation, we 
define the resolution of conflict as a continuous process of settling of conflict 
situations; this process takes the form of a bilateral negotiation or a bargaining 
or a judicial dispute setting. The latter requires a persuasive conflict, and in 
settling of outstanding persuasive conflict, the dispute settler should have to 
issue a binding decision in the case brought before him. Following Martin 
Goulding, we accept three main types of dispute settling: 1) adjudication, 2) 
conciliation and 3) therapeutic integration (Goulding 2001). In adjudication, the 
settlement must consist of an award to the winning party, which is intended for 
a formal resolution of the dispute and the recovery of a state of order. The 
award should also have the character of a binding decision: thus for occurrence 
of adjudicatory settlement of conflict it must be of a kind that can be settled by 
making an award. The aim of adjudication is to achieve settlement of disputes 
by adjustment or compromise between the claims, demands, or interests of par-
ties. It should be stressed here that a normative conflict is not a logical contra-
diction and cannot even be compared to a contradiction in logical terms. More-
over, unlike a logical system that proves inconsistent to use, the legal system 
does not become unfit for use because of normative conflict. In the following 
section, before introducing the theoretical assessment of conflict in legal theo-
ries, we are going to sketch some ideas about the practical applications of the 
concept of Conflict of Laws. 
 
 
2.2. The Doctrine of Conflict of Laws and  
its Confinements 
Although Perelman’s concept of antinomy has received an instant and direct 
application in Conflict of Law, its accurate rendition would require a certain 
methodological manoeuvre. That is for three apparent reasons. Firstly, the most 
obvious type of non-unity creating an antinomy in law is the simple conflict 
between legal provisions between two legal orders. Secondly, conflicts among 
different legal systems are governed by different rules than are conflicts within 
one legal system, because the rules developed for intra-systemic conflict do not 
work well in the context of inter-systemic conflict. Thirdly, add to this the fact 
that Conflict of Laws is a major conflict that could render the legal systems 
ineffective and even lead to a failure of the system. In discussing the application 
of antinomies to doctrines of Conflict of Laws, we should be also helpful to 
keep in mind that Conflict of Laws involves different kinds of choice-of-law 
procedures and justifications of such choice in a particular instance of Conflict 
of Laws; it acknowledges the existence of incompatibility between different 
frames of legal reference between different legal systems. In any choice of ap-
plicable law, the deciding judge must resolve the juridical antinomy by choos-
ing one of two possible laws that will justify the judge’s decision. The judge has 
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to justify his/her own choice in order to maintain the appearance of the law as a 
stable system. Despite the surplus of work done on numerous practical aspects 
of Conflict of Laws, to our best knowledge no such comprehensive study exists 
that can fully account for the theoretical complexity of the subject. Unfortunate-
ly, our present discussion cannot engage at length with all theoretical issues of 
Conflict of Laws and with gross simplification, it may be appropriate to focus 
our attention on those concepts of Conflict of Laws that are of particular signifi-
cance for our thesis. We take Conflict of Laws as a special theoretic kind of 
inter-systemic conflict, detached from most of its practical connotations. Sim-
plistically speaking, Conflict of Laws as a legal discipline is of particular signif-
icance, for it constitutes a branch of the law in each state, country, or other ju-
risdiction, that determines whether, in dealing with a particular legal situation, 
its law or a foreign element – the law of some other jurisdiction – should be 
applied: in simplistic terms, it deals with choice of law, choice of jurisdiction 
and recognition of foreign law. Thus, we deal with Conflict of Laws when a 
given conduct is subject to regulations from different legal systems. This state-
ment, together with Kevelson’s suggestions, sets the scene for a scientific in-
quiry into problems of private international law, and the role the concept of 
conflict plays in legal doctrines. In our own opinion, the main problem here is 
that there is more than just one route by which Conflict of Laws could be de-
fined in legal theories. For example, the most typical designation of “conflict of 
laws” is somewhat inappropriate, because the task of this branch of the law is to 
eliminate differences between two or more systems of law, which make com-
peting claims to govern the issue, which is before the court; to determine the 
applicable law on the basis of Conflict of Laws rules designed for different are-
as of law in the abstract, without regard to the content of the substantive law 
(Knop, Michaels et al. 2008). Strictly speaking, the questions of operation, as-
certainment, and review of foreign law are not part of the subject matter of con-
flict of laws. It is commonly accepted that classical Common Law rules of Con-
flict of Laws are concerned not only with the competence of a court to hear and 
determine a case, but also they are concerned with ‘choice of law’ rules and 
recognition/reinforcement of judgments rendered by foreign courts. A case is 
not a conflicts case unless it contains a foreign element: it is primarily only 
when the question of jurisdiction arises that the problems fall within the area 
designated as Conflicts of Law (Collier 1987). Here, the question of jurisdiction 
is the same as a question of applicable law for dispute settling. Furthermore, 
having to make up for conflict of jurisdictions, the institutions of adjudicating 
bodies may claim to have exclusive jurisdictions to address the factual aspects 
of a matter. As mentioned earlier, given the scope of this article we would not 
be able to provide a precise recapitulation of Conflict of Laws. The features of 
Conflict of Laws we try to elucidate in this thesis, are related to the focal ques-
tions in conflicts of law, i.e., which jurisdiction should hear the case and what 
substantive legal principles should apply. In this respect, the classical presenta-
tion of the Conflict of Laws, made from the state perspective, is being gradually 
replaced by the presentation made from the perspective of the judge who tries to 
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‘localize’ the contract: therefore, it is more appropriate to use the term ‘applica-
tion of foreign law’, which better suggests the role of the court in introducing 
the foreign element (Geeroms 2004). 
The discussion makes clear what appears to be a prevailing view on another 
fundamental goal of Conflict of Laws – which is to advance the interests of 
private persons rather than those of the state or government. Needless to say 
that from the perspective of international legal theories private international law 
has a dualistic character, balancing international consensus with domestic 
recognition and implementation, as well as balancing sovereign actions of states 
with those of actors in the private sector. In keeping with the suggestion that we 
may better understand Conflict of Laws through its dualistic character, one 
could look at the principle of equality that informs the approach to international 
relations, taken by other areas of international law. That is, the context must be 
such as to allow courts to interpret international transactions so as to ensure the 
effectiveness of private international private law, and avoid conflict by employ-
ing the common set of interpretative strategies. However, after incorporating 
international law as a part of domestic law the original meaning of international 
norms might have been lost. In this manner, Conflict of Laws in private interna-
tional law differs from the classic narrow definition of conflict that still prevails 
in public international law: a conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility 
arises only where a party of the two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with 
obligations under both treaties.2 
As is also noted elsewhere, different functional approaches to one of the per-
vasive problems of conflicts law (choice of law) are usually congruent with 
different economic models, and also connected to doctrinal attempts to intro-
duce the manipulative doctrines of characterization, renvoi and public policy; 
however, some of those approaches lead as far as to further ‘conflicting’’ justice 
by choosing spatially most appropriate law and praising ‘party autonomy’ 
(Kegel 1979). Thus Conflict of Law doctrine contributed to the development of 
a forum law rule in that it encourages ‘forum-shopping’, i.e., a person starting 
an action might be tempted to choose a forum of venue not because it is the 
most appropriate forum but because the conflict of law rules that it applies will 
prompt the application of the law that he or she prefers. For example, by taking 
advantages of liberal principles of Conflict of Laws and plaintiff-friendly liabil-
ity laws, American courts attract the attention of foreign litigants due to the 
expansive acceptance of compensatory and punitive damages (Smith 2012). 
From the comparative perspective, we should, however, make explicit the 
differences in the scope of Conflict of Laws in USA and Europe. First, Europe-
an jurisprudence widely uses an alternative term - ‘private international law’- 
that is even less accurate and descriptive than Conflict of Laws. Therefore, we 
must declare that private international law in Europe is the body of conventions, 
model laws, legal guides, and other documents and instruments that regulate 
private relationships across national borders between private individuals and 
                                                          
2  The concept was introduced by Winfried Jenks in 1953, see (Jenks 1953). 
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corporations, though also with relationships between states and government so 
far as their relationships are governed by municipal law. In legal theory, inter-
national law has traditionally been thought of as a unique discourse system that 
is bound together by objectivity. However, in international private law, there is 
a conceptual tension between external and internal perspectives on law: the 
former locating with reference to a normative system external to the system of 
the forum. The latter creates choice in the process of interpretation of the fo-
rum’s own positive law (Brilmayer 1995). Much of the tension in the doctrine 
discussed herein is credited to difficulties of explaining the legitimacy of the 
external normative systems. The internalization of commercial transactions and 
cost of time-consuming transnational legal resolutions of dispute led the market 
to rely on alternative system seen as capturing the tension between opposing 
perspectives of private international law. As between member states, European 
international private law becomes even tighter than ever before, because the 
principle of mutual recognition widely bars preference of the forum: party au-
tonomy is no longer merely a tool to determine the applicable law but an in-
strument toward a competition among legal orders; choice of law is not only 
(perhaps) a right, but also an obligation. 
In the United States, Conflict of Law concerns the conflicts between the 
states of the union and the federal law, meanwhile European doctrine of the 
conflict of laws, which has been for many years under attack of critics for being 
merely formalist, has seen many changes. American doctrine of Conflict of 
Laws is also concerned with issues relating to property and contractual disputes, 
as they are inextricably tied to intangible aspects of vested rights and more spe-
cifically to problems of freedom of contract (such as questions of contractual 
dispositions etc.). Those issues were classified by Kevelson as semiotic repre-
sentations of the individual rights and demands of the individual persons of 
nations of the world (Kevelson 1991). The concept of property and the freedom 
of contract in their intermediate sign-functions are indispensable to the propa-
gating of the new values, ideas into juridical discourse. We could regard free-
dom of contract as a doctrine emerging as ‘sign’ of individuals’ capacity to 
make binding agreements. This principle was initially supported by judicial 
faith in the natural laws of economics and subsequently encapsulated into the 
Constitution by reading the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment bars upon depri-
vation of liberty or property without due process of law to extend to employ-
ment contracts. Today, the idea is generally considered redundant being eventu-
ally replaced by the state regulation of contracts and reliance-based theories of 
liability: the goods in a free-bargaining society distributed by the less and less 
powerful individuals. When the foundations of free bargaining-society were 
about to change, some legal scholars3 directed their critique at the sanctity of 
contract by proclaiming ‘the inevitable death of contract’ in its classical Com-
mon Law form, where a contract was said to come into existence after the ac-
cepting of an offer by the recipient. 
                                                          
3  See, for example Atiyah  (1979); Gilmore (1974). 
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As far as legal doctrine is concerned, the principle of freedom of contract 
aims to restore the balance of interests of individuals and ‘legal persons’ – the 
balance which was being violated and imbalanced by the pragmatic considera-
tion of contractors. Accordingly, American legal realists, who were mainly pre-
occupied with pragmatic concerns of legal doctrine, argued that one does not 
have freedom of contract if the economic system created by the state’s laws puts 
one in a situation of vastly unequal bargaining power. It is important to empha-
size here that from semiotic perspectives, the concept of ‘contract’ itself ac-
quires here a clear symbolic function referring to different perspectives on con-
tract – among which we can mention Sir Frederick Pollock’s idea of a contract 
and archaic form of contact. The former refers chiefly to symbolic doctrine of 
meeting of minds that gained much support in the courts in the 19th century 
when for the attainment of a contract’s purpose, it was requisite that the minds 
of the parties should meet. The latter would be possible to trace back to archaic 
forms of semiotic rituals, when parties of contract cut their palms, then held 
them together to mingle the blood. Given that the symbolic nature of contract 
appears to be universal, we could also recall Cassirer, who claimed that “the 
social contract is a symbolic construct, and it is a necessary vehicle of the mind 
to attain to a specifically human life” (Coskun 2007: 130). Nevertheless, Cassi-
rer and Pollock seemed to distance themselves from the semiotic tendencies by 
focusing on particular aspects of contract. Another important influence came 
from Juri Lotman who first expanded the symbolic features of contract into that 
what he described as one of two basic mechanisms of culture, with another 
mechanism being a self-commitment/self-giving (which might be as well trans-
lated in this context as dispensation, a religious contract). In his article, 
“‘Agreement’ and ‘Self-Giving’ as Archetypical Models of Culture”, Lotman 
made use of essential contrast between a conditional act of ‘agreement’/  
‘contractual transaction’, which lies at foundation of Western European culture 
and an unconditional act of ‘self-giving’, which is, Lotman argues, a character-
istic feature of Russian cultures.4 In a significant sense, Lotman’s account of 
contract as an underlying cultural archetype and Cassirer’s idea of (social) con-
tract as a symbolic concept, reverberate with features of the modern, rational-
ized contract law, for the latter is still permeating with symbolic figures of great 
significance, including even deliberate refutations of logic reasons – such as 
impossible contracts. On one hand, in his quest beyond the limits of structuralist 
account of the binary oppositions, Lotman assumed that although there are al-
ways two underlying mechanisms of culture, the relationships between them are 
not opposing but rather complimentary. On the other hand, although some ques-
tions related to the concept of conflict come up throughout Lotman’s paper, it is 
surprising that he has never tried to develop a coherent semiotic theory of con-
flict. 
 
                                                          
4  The unreserved ‘self-giving’ is the model, in Russian culture, for personal relations of 
the highest type. See Lotman and Uspensky (1984: 125–140). 
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3. CONFLICT OF LAWS 
3.1. The Theoretical Dimensions  
of Conflict in Law 
As we have observed in Chapter 2, the question of Conflict of Law is indeed 
complex. At the risk of muddling the question further and adding confusion to 
discussion, we argue that in order to grasp more fully the concept of conflict, 
we should assume that conflict could be assessed on different levels of legal 
discourse. This task of assessing different layers of legal discourse is complicat-
ed enough for the kind of conflicts that we identify as the most relevant ones. 
Therefore, in order to deal with different layers of conflict, it is useful to have 
regard to the theoretical dimensions of conflict. We start with the simplest form, 
i.e., Conflict of Laws. Conflict of Laws involves different kinds of choice-of-
law procedures and justifications of such choice; the problems of conflict in law 
assume the existence of incompatibility between different frames of legal refer-
ence within the same legal system. It is one of the major goals of legal theory to 
fulfil a particularly important task to distinguish in every legal problem those 
factors that reflect conflicting values and pick up those values that can be as-
sessed in the objective analysis in legal context. This contextual meaning of 
value conflict is probably best explained by Lyotard’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
rule of the result: it takes an event involving a contradiction, for example a legal 
‘hard’ case that appears to be beyond resolution. In this case, Lyotard claimed, 
Hegel’s rule of the result would be able to do as much justice as possible to the 
conflict by incorporating it within any future judgments (Lyotard 1988: 97) and 
narrowing down further the irreducible minimum of conflicting evaluations. 
However, even after applying this rule to the conflict in laws, a certain degree 
of incongruence will be inevitably preserved in overarching/overlapping sys-
tems of rules, when different rules are constitutive of different type of legally 
regulated behaviour, such as in the relations between public system of legal 
rules and regulations of ‘private autonomy’. Although regulations of ‘private 
autonomy’ might appear to be complex, liberal legal systems private autonomy 
is generally reached by reducing the influence of public regulations. Habermas 
was also aware of that problem of incongruence. He claimed, that for conflicts 
between different types of discourses (such as moral and legal discourses), the 
resolution of incommensurability is guaranteed by the universal demand of sub-
stituting the unity of practical reason with the autonomy of discourses (Haber-
mas 1988). Thus, in theory, a system of moral values in general is expected to 
be in correspondence with a code of law in which it functions as a point of ref-
erence. In practice, most of conflicts in laws are resolved through the reference 
to the validity and legitimacy of legal norms, to the extent that results depend on 
decisional texts produced a posteriori. For example, the conflict in Estonian 
contract law is regulated by the rules on legal interpretation of international 
contracts that were subject to the Vienna Convention on International Sales of 
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Goods (CISG)5 and – from the European supranational perspective – by the 
Principles of European Contract law (PECL) (Lando and Beale 2000). Even in 
the case of a mixed legal system in transition there was a clear tendency to sub-
ordinate the Estonian rule of law to inter-and supranational legal order of the 
European Union. At the same time, we can observe that in the case of a hetero-
geneous system of law, the hierarchy is more difficult to determine since the 
values are different and often may come into apparent conflict. Therefore, we 
deem it important that generic notion of conflict in law could be subdivided 
further into conflict of rules and conflict of principles. The conflict of rules is 
usually resolved either by amending one of conflicting norms or by invalidating 
rule by special rules of priority or by using some special rules of systemic inter-
pretation for resolving the conflict. The collision of hierarchically higher rules 
(principles) are usually resolved by weighting them against each other, because 
the principles have a hierarchy of weight or importance. Usually, discussions of 
conflict between rules start with questioning the notion of reason, which is usu-
ally understood either as a constitutive (institutional) fact or as an epistemic fact 
significant for the presence of another fact. 
The important difference of principle-based reasoning from rule-based rea-
soning of principles is that in order to resolve the conflict, the principles have to 
be weighted by taking the relative weight of each.6 The same idea is expressed 
by Robert Alexy, who, in order to reinforce his view, made use of a special 
weight formula. Alexy maintains that whenever there is a conflict between two 
legal principles (values), the traditional rules of interpretation do not suffice. 
Instead, the conflict should be resolved by adopting an elaborated weight for-
mula: the final legal decision is then taken according to what Alexy deems the 
‘law of conflicting principles’ – the circumstances under which one principle 
takes precedence over another constitute the conditions of a rule which has the 
same legal consequences as the principle taking precedence (Alexy 2003). 
As a side note, we can mention that the plethora of conflicting legal provi-
sions in the Estonian legal system during the transition stage illustrates the per-
tinence of Alexy’s proposal: one such striking example of a logical inconsisten-
cy between legal rules was found in Estonian Law of Obligations Act §29 (In-
terpretation of contract), and this inconsistency was intentionally maintained by 
legislator for several reasons. Not least among these reasons is that the legal 
system of Estonia during the last decade of 20th century was in so-called devel-
opment or ‘transition’. As noted by Kevelson, trans-discursive relations be-
tween two different ideologies brought Peirce’s pragmatism into the arena of 
global conflict where Law plays a double role: Law versus Law (Kevelson 
1997). Moreover, like in any transition, this interim period (1991–1999) of tran-
                                                          
5  Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods. (United Nations Document A/CONF.97/19; United Nations Sales Publication 
No. E.81.IV.3) (Text of the Convention also reprinted in UNCITRAL Yearbook (1980), Vol. 
XI, part three, I (United Nations Sales Publication No. E.81.V.8)). 
6  See Ronald Dworkin (1978: 22–27) on weighting the principles; Joseph Raz (1979: 22); 
Peczenik (1996: 297–329). 
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sition of Estonia from the Soviet republic to the post-Soviet capitalist state was 
characterized by co-existence of two asymmetrical discourses whose double 
functions and meanings radically dissociated from each other: the very idea of a 
supreme binding rule of law deviated from the vision of Soviet jurisprudence 
(Gräzin 1997). However, the devolution of an idea is not equivalent with its 
demise but is rather an instance of conflict with possibilities. Under a tide of 
political utilitarianism, the shift in dominance from the disposed Communist 
regime to the emergent Baltic capitalist state did feel like more than an expres-
sion of the internal and relevant incompatibilities between communist ideolo-
gy/principle of socialist law and the Western doctrine/principle of rule of law: it 
was rather a paradoxical situation with two colliding universes of discourse 
(Kevelson 1997: 1143). The shift from ‘the socialist society’ to ‘the free mar-
ket’, as articulated by semiotics, advances the efforts to understand the political 
and juridical events (circumstances) in those times. 
 
 
3.2. Conflict from Phenomenological and  
Hermeneutic Perspectives 
On the practical level of legal reasoning, the conflict of law represents a situa-
tion of divergence between various types of underlying interpretative methods, 
techniques, approaches, and methodological preconditions. Legal scholars cir-
cumvent the situation of conflict by elevating one particular type of interpreta-
tion to the preceding status at the expense of others in order to promote its par-
ticular value. Hence, it has been established that one interpretation can call for a 
counter-interpretation that provides reasons why there are no legitimate reasons 
to consider the preceding status of the former interpretation. Thus, we can no-
tice that the competing interpretations are built not in idealized hermeneutic 
space but in a much messier medium in which conflict results from the process-
es of interpretation and counter-interpretation. In effect, we are ready to accept 
that interpretations and counter-interpretations can also be nested into a com-
plex hierarchy, in which interpretations could require additional interpretations 
that take the form of a conflict resolution and appear as such in their own ways. 
The strong resistance that traditional methods of interpretation of a linguistic 
expression encountered in recent discussions is usually attributed to the failure 
of traditional legal theory to establish the coherent theory of textual interpreta-
tion. As we all know, earliest legal theories suffered from the paucity of analyti-
cal methodology that prevented an explicit detailed analysis of interpretation in 
legal context. More recent analytical theories of law took a more radical and 
expansive stance on problems of interpretation, which has ultimately brought 
analytical legal theories into the midst of dialogue with phenomenology and 
hermeneutics. 
Given the limitations of paper’s scope and space, we should restrict our fo-
cus only to the most important aspects of this dialogue. It is necessary first of all 
to formulate those aspects clearly in some strict terms. There is a widely shared 
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consensus that phenomenological approach, being applied to legal phenomena, 
could help us to clarify the structures of legal phenomena in their eidetic purity 
through the bracketing (in Husserl’s terms, phenomenological epoché), i.e., the 
intuitive examination of phenomena as they are originally given to our con-
sciousness (Husserl 1975). The bracketing or transcendental reduction enable us 
to capture what is directly given and evident to our intuition, for it is precisely 
intuition that expresses the capacity to know what is directly given and evident, 
and it is through sensible intuition (noumenon) we can reach ‘the things them-
selves’. Husserl’s classical phenomenology includes many types of intuition, 
but only this single one that captures ‘invariant general structures’, that is, the 
essences (Wesen) of phenomena is important for our purposes, because it ena-
bles knowledge and understanding of a priori essence of law (Husserl 1975). 
Although Husserl believed that his method could be applied in all the various 
sciences, the centrality of (phenomenological) structures in legal discourses was 
not accompanied by any systemic reflections over phenomenological presuppo-
sitions in treating problems encountered in the philosophy of law. It seems like-
ly that the main reason why legal scientists were so reserved in application of 
Husserl’s methods to legal phenomena, is that the object of legal science itself – 
positive law – is in a constant state of continuous development. So, in bracket-
ing legal phenomena (in other words, in suspending our belief in the actual ex-
istence of positive laws), we are actually led back to our intrinsic experiences, 
which are very difficult to objectify in legal science. The obvious question that 
arises is how we define those intuited intrinsic experiences of law. What were 
these experiences of law: the postulates of divine/natural law (jus gentum), 
moral principles, or abstract legal concepts? 
With that said we should mention several rigorous attempts to apply phe-
nomenological presuppositions to legal matters, such as hermeneutic studies 
carried out by Adolph Reinach. Reinach made use of phenomenology in order 
to reveal the essence or the a priori structure of civil law by engaging in de-
scriptions of essential legal concepts, such as the promise, property, representa-
tion, lending and liens, which he expressed in a forms of statements (axioms) of 
a phenomenologically oriented, pure science of law (Reinach 1983). By analys-
ing crucial relationship of civil law – the relationship between the fundamental 
legal notion of a claim (Anspruch) and notion of obligation (Verbindlichkeit) – 
Reinach figured out the only possible source of this relationship would be from 
associated notion of a promise, which is an universal matter of a priori necessi-
ty and, just as every promise presupposes that the promisor’s will is strategical-
ly directed to the course of action contained in the promise. Because promising 
is an act of will that exists regardless of other human actions, its essence is to 
create claims and obligations simultaneously and thus, to constitute meaning of 
positive (civil) law. Reinach aimed at sketching out an alternative to legal for-
malism and his profound ideas further explicated by Gerhardt Husserl (Edmund 
Husserl’s son), who believed that the bracketing of legal objects is facilitated by 
the comparative examination of law in different legal cultures (Husserl 1964). 
Although Gerhardt Husserl gleaned his insights mainly from his father’s phe-
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nomenological philosophy, some of his theses (for example, historicity of inter-
pretation) were pursued in detail through the tradition of hermeneutics. Follow-
ing the footsteps of historical jurisprudence, Husserl assumed that every legal 
system represents a certain phase in history. Since all legal orders have their 
own history, the phenomenological approach allows for purely synchronic ob-
servation in an intra-systemic (synchronic) way without referring to universal 
time; the observation is unencumbered by past, present, and future of the legal 
system. At the same time, the fundamental legal concepts are part of an abstract 
intuited time and, therefore, are not synchronic with human actions to which 
they ascribe legal meaning (Husserl 1964: 32–34). 
Given the universality of phenomenological approach, it is not surprising 
that the application of phenomenology to legal analysis could be an attractive 
idea. Yet, despite of the persuasiveness of legal phenomenology in comparative 
legal studies, we should realize that phenomenological approaches to legal phe-
nomena outlined above seem to be less promising for inquiry into more com-
plex legal issues, such as legal reasoning in conflict situations. The unavoidable 
shortcoming of legal phenomenology is that it is fixed on the description of a 
priori existing structures, which are not reliant upon the human actions: unfor-
tunately, legal phenomenology does not entail the encounters with the interpre-
tation of human actions, which is deemed to be always reliant upon the position 
of the interpreter. As mentioned elsewhere, it is interpretation that has always 
been lawyers’ most important task, because in legal discourse the model of 
communication is reversed: it is not the receiver but the sender who stands in 
the foreground when the message is interpreted. The model of communication 
posited by law brings to mind the difference that may be seen between commu-
nicational and hermeneutic models. These differences could be succinctly 
summarized as follows. A communicational model looks at the use made of 
language (including its ‘meaning’) from the viewpoint of the author’s intention; 
the hermeneutic approach looks at this use from the viewpoint of the interpret-
er. As mentioned in the beginning of our paper, both approaches are employed 
in law on regular basis, and authorial intention is not necessarily given the pri-
macy in interpretation. On the practical side of the problem, the position and 
authority of the interpreter are usually of much bigger weight in actual court 
trials although they are also by no means devoid of theoretical problems. Seen 
from the theoretical point of view, discursive plan of semiotic production within 
a dominant discourse of law inevitably seem to offer different discursive sub-
ject-(speaking) positions, providing thus a place from where ideologically-
charged narratives of law would emerge. This practical observation is especially 
important when we need to deploy hermeneutic approach to understand legal 
texts and legal actions. The subjects in legal (or political) process may have 
been offered powerful or, to the contrary, efficacious subject-positions these in 
their turn became parts of narrative construction of law (compare the legal sta-
tus of women in Islamic law; the legal definition of non-combatants etc.). 
Everything said before about privileging the speaking position of certain ac-
tors applies to practical questions as well. Nevertheless, in our attempt to adapt 
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hermeneutic methods to analysis of conflict, we are not going to leave phenom-
enology behind, since hermeneutics and phenomenology are traditionally con-
sidered complimentary strands of critical philosophy. The combination of phe-
nomenology and hermeneutics proves to be a vehicle of extending hermeneutic 
ideas toward domains of legal interpretation. In support to our assumption, we 
can cite Paul Ricoeur, who argued that phenomenology is the place where mod-
ern hermeneutics originates, for it retains from phenomenology the central in-
sight into the intentionality of consciousness and the methodological technique 
of ‘bracketing’: the main distinction between phenomenology and modern her-
meneutics is that the latter rejects the idealist interpretation that Husserl later 
gave to phenomenology.7 
Narrowly defined, hermeneutics has traditionally been regarded as study of 
meaning, in which the leading idea is to investigate philosophical presupposi-
tions under which every interpretation takes place, it is the study of the method-
ological principles of interpretation and explanation. Hence, the shift in interest 
from the interpretation of literary texts to the interpretation of legal texts seems 
almost natural. It is also used as a technique in Critical Legal Studies: ‘the re-
turn’ to hermeneutics is a touchstone for law for embracing old traditions that 
provide the invaluable resources available theorists who seek to foster persua-
sion and understanding and thus it is very important to advocates of Critical 
Legal Studies because interpretation is central to legal theory. In the following 
passages, we are going to re-centre the focus of the paper away from the discus-
sion and towards a brief account of historical background of legal hermeneutics, 
with phenomenological hermeneutics as a central node. 
Until the 19th century, hermeneutics was being developed mainly in the form 
of particular ‘theories’ formulated in the distinct fields of theology (biblical 
exegesis), philology, and jurisprudence: it was only due to Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey that general philosophical (humanistic) hermeneutics arose. Instead of 
seeing Schleiermacher as a founder of general hermeneutics, we rely on the 
tradition of seeing him as a mediator who stitched together different hermeneu-
tic traditions providing thus a solid basis on which new hermeneutics of under-
standing could be grounded. This hermeneutics of understanding, Schleierma-
cher thought, could be provided if the problem of interpreting speech was treat-
ed in a philosophical general manner instead of occasional manners prevalent at 
that time in forms of specialized hermeneutics: biblical, literary, and legal 
(Schleiermacher 1998). Each of these specialized hermeneutics itself had a long 
tradition and was devoted to framing the rules of interpretation pertaining to a 
specific body of texts. Biblical hermeneutics was devoted to the problems of 
interpreting the Bible. Literary hermeneutics was devoted to the problems of 
interpreting Greek and Latin classics. Legal hermeneutics was devoted to the 
problems of interpreting law, especially Roman law. Schleiermacher was 
strongly influenced by biblical hermeneutics and literary hermeneutics, and 
although there are clear resemblances between Schleiermacher’s general her-
                                                          
7  Further information in Paul Ricoeur (1973, 1974). 
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meneutics and legal hermeneutics, it is highly unlikely that Schleiermacher was 
influenced by classical legal hermeneutics. Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is 
basically an attempt to smooth over obvious acute discrepancies of biblical and 
literary hermeneutics by shifting focus to the general problem of interpreting 
speech. As a result of this undertaking, hermeneutics no longer came to denote 
the art of interpretation only: it is not surprising that Schleiermacher’s follower, 
W. Dilthey, elevated hermeneutics to the highest rank of universal methodology 
of the humanities, which he called “the methodology of understanding” (Dilthey 
1996). This alliance of hermeneutics with other human sciences proved to be a 
successful recipe for the transformation of hermeneutics – once a theory of in-
terpretation of texts – into ‘true science or ontology of understanding’ in its 
generalized form (Heidegger 1962; Gadamer 1993). Despite the growing scep-
ticism about the feasibility and utility of ‘universalist’ projects, the introduction 
of ontological and methodological universalism with the phenomenologically 
oriented hermeneutics of Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur, facilitated 
the reception of hermeneutics in legal theory and it started to play its significant 
role in theoretical jurisprudence. Thus, it is only in the 20th century that legal 
hermeneutics became a more specific philosophy of interpretation. Within this 
philosophy, the problem of understanding received its culmination, and under-
standing (at least within phenomenologically oriented hermeneutics) is identi-
fied or treated as synonymous with interpretation. Indeed, in phenomenological 
hermeneutics, understanding is a type of cognition, which we would expect to 
possess an intuitive character. It was, however, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who 
shifted the focus of interest in hermeneutics from the questions of methodology 
and epistemology of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschafien) to clarification 
of the ontological foundation of existence. This is so perhaps because one of the 
primary texts of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer’s “Truth and Method” 
(Gadamer 1975), is read in general as providing a link between philosophy and 
the sciences, and, in particular, it approximates the elements of interpretation to 
the process of adjudication. In the process of understanding, this type of ‘pure’ 
intuition runs counter to another type of intuition that may be described as a 
‘rational’ intuition. It is the latter type of intuition that opens the door to the vast 
variety of actual ways of understanding and interpreting. According to Gada-
mer, the only being that can be understood is language (Gadamer 1993: 48). 
Indeed, our knowledge of the world is possible only through the medium of 
language; it is through the medium of language we are able to determine the 
horizons of hermeneutic significances against which we consider objects of 
indirect cognition. A slightly more important aspect of this hermeneutic ap-
proach is related to the notion of the horizon of the interpreter and ‘text’, which 
needs not be a written text. These horizons are heavily influenced by tradition. 
Thus, it would hardly be unusual to suggest that in modern culture, which is 
heavily influenced by law, law would be an important aspect of one’s context or 
tradition. Finally, in Gadamer’s view, language is not only the means through 
which we experience the world and the tool with which we enter this world, but 
also an expression of our possession of the word (Gadamer 1992). We shall not 
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go into the details of this relationship. Rather we shall confine ourselves to ob-
serving that everything given to us in the process of understanding (in herme-
neutic experience) is given through the medium of language. This conclusion is 
especially applicable within the context of legal interpretation. 
The universalism of language was understood differently and more broadly 
in that was optimistically called the unified science of understanding. The uni-
versal promise of phenomenological hermeneutics was met with a moderate 
appreciation, since it allows scholars to tackle the fundamental problem of the 
understanding of individual being (Dasein), appealing to intuitive methods that 
enable one to know the very essence of this being. Such universality could pose 
a problem to the applied phenomenological hermeneutics of law. In order to 
underscore the omnipotence of this problem we would refer to an eloquent 
quote taken from Gregory Leyh’s book: “As for the law, hermeneutics does not 
think of it in terms of the conceptual or methodological interests of the legal 
theorist, still less in terms of the strategic interests of legal or judicial practice; 
rather, the concern is with the conditions in which these interests are pursued. A 
‘hermeneutics of the law’ in this respect would not be the same as a theory of 
the law. On the contrary, hermeneutics is apt to seem a little too wayward or 
free in its thinking with respect to the law (or indeed any subject). This will 
certainly appear the case when it comes to the question of law and language, or 
what in hermeneutics would be called the linguistically (Sprachlichkeit) of the 
law” (Leyh 1992: 27). 
Before returning to the discussion of conflict of interpretations, let us first 
outline other dimensions of the problem, which is as old as the tradition of legal 
hermeneutics itself. Already the founder of the humanist tradition of legal her-
meneutics, German jurist Thibaut was aware of the persisting problem of hier-
archical relations between various methods of interpretation (Thibaut and von 
Buchholtz 1846). However, he saw no problems in that the science of law (ju-
risprudence) could be influenced by philosophical hermeneutics, which offered 
the opportunity to solve jurisprudential problems of statute interpretation (such 
as conflict between different types of interpretation). Thibaut’s key assumptions 
rested on the common feature of interpretation stressed by founders of herme-
neutics: the definite rules of the order of priority of the different interpretative 
viewpoints (types of interpretation) do not exist, and therefore the interpretation 
becomes an ‘art’ rather than a science. In Thibaut’s view, every legal act is fur-
ther developed through interpretation by means of law enforcement as a herme-
neutic process (Thibaut and von Buchholtz 1846). Whatever will be the ultimate 
interpretation of this idea, we must keep in mind that Thibaut advanced his idea 
not in the spirit of dismissing established canons of legal hermeneutics but ra-
ther in an attempt to revoke the tradition of limiting objects of hermeneutics to 
written texts. 
In short, in Thibaut’s time, traditional hermeneutics of law required a careful 
re-examination. Whatever did not survive the reformulation of hermeneutics into 
‘purified’ form would have had to be expunged from the body of hermeneutics. 
When the revision of hermeneutic legacy had been accomplished, it became clear 
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to Thibaut that he needed to define the relationship between grammatical and 
other kinds of legal interpretation in the following manner. Grammatical interpre-
tation should be directed solely at the literal sense of a given law. The grammati-
cal canon of interpretation finds its limits only where the meaning of a law cannot 
be understood from ordinary linguistic usage. At this point, the ‘purpose’ of the 
law and the intention of the lawgiver have to be considered (‘logical interpreta-
tion’). Thus, taking a major step with Etienne-Denis duc du Pasquier’s 1847 edi-
tion of the interpretation of the Justinian Codex (‘L'interprétation des Institutes de 
Justinian’) (Pasquier 1847) and von Savigny’s studies on legal interpretation 
(Savigny 1951) around that same period, the continental doctrine of legal herme-
neutics experienced an evolution from a disjointed set of interpretive techniques 
into a systematic approach. In England, especially during the eighteenth century, 
the evolution of legal hermeneutics retained its specific Anglo-Saxon distinctions, 
which opposes it to the continental tradition. To review, the Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion of hermeneutics promoted a deliberate interrelation between legal interpreta-
tion and logic. This specificity is attributed, in particular, to influences of Jeremy 
Bentham and John Austin, following the pattern of what we might call the Whig 
hermeneutics with its essential emphasis upon political and constitutional devel-
opment and upon the growth of opposition to royal power. The celebrated and 
enthusiastic reception of Francis Lieber’s ‘Legal Hermeneutics in Law and Poli-
tics’ aided and abetted the development of a specific Anglo-Saxon tradition of 
legal hermeneutics.8 It has been argued that this peculiar pattern of Anglo-Saxon 
hermeneutics caused the interpretive ‘upheaval’ in American legal thought. 
Lieber’s ‘science’ of hermeneutics fitted better the doctrine of legal reasoning 
originated with Whig jurisprudence. In Lieber’s doctrine of hermeneutics, the 
methodological privilege was granted to the study of legal ‘signs’. That is, as 
early as in 1839, Lieber succeeded to equip the hermeneutics of law with very 
rudimentary semiotic concept of signs at just about the time of Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s birth. Lieber stated the earliest expression of a semiotic approach to legal 
discovery and interpretation, stressing the communicative (or, rather semiotic) 
nature of interpretation required in the defining of signs: “the signs which man 
uses, the using of which implies intention, for the purpose of conveying ideas or 
notions to his fellow-creatures, are very various, for instance, gestures, signals, 
telegraphs, monuments, sculpture of all kinds, pictorial, and hieroglyphic signs” 
(Lieber 1880: 17). 
Jumping ahead of our discussion, it should be noted that Lieber is considered 
a forerunner to tradition which, in its most forward-reaching concepts, has striv-
en to develop an interdisciplinary theory of argumentation by fusing semiotics, 
hermeneutics, rhetoric, logic, and analytical jurisprudence in the powerful anal-
ysis of legal argument (the final section of paper contains much less elaborated 
semiotic account of argumentation in conflict situation). In the meantime in 
Europe, the binding link between Thibaut’s methods of legal hermeneutics and 
the contemporary philosophy was further expounded of von Savigny. Von Sa-
                                                          
8  We used 1880’ edition of Lieber’s work (Lieber 1880). 
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vigny’s seemingly remote musings with theory of interpretation had important 
long-run influences on legal theories. Just as Lieber’s hermeneutics may serve 
as an example of embracing the semiotic doctrine, we could mitigate von Savi-
gny’s blunders in incomplete reception of classical hermeneutics, since von 
Savigny argued for methodological autonomy of law (Savigny 1951). The cru-
cial point about von Savigny’s version of hermeneutics is that von Savigny 
availed himself of solutions proposed by Schleiermacher, and started with gen-
eral hermeneutics of law; von Savigny’s hermeneutics commenced not with the 
traditional special case of opaque legal texts but with the understanding of law 
itself. It is now where a conflict concerning the interpretation cannot occur: at 
the point where, the rules of priority or hierarchy of methods are not necessary 
and are, in fact, devoid of practical meaning. With the practical concerns in the 
background, the lack of explicit rules of priority in von Savigny’s account 
spawned a great deal of justified criticism. As it turns out, not having anything 
to say about hierarchy of methods, von Savigny’s approach is clearly self-
refuting on many levels, since it was impossible to decide without referring to a 
rule of priority which of the four canons of interpretation (objective, genetic, 
technical, and teleological) should be the decisive one in the event of a conflict. 
In addition, the highly important teleological element was said to be missing in 
von Savigny’s account, and the process of interpretation remained an arbitrary 
process. Still, although arguably many questions of hermeneutics raised in the 
modern studies to the level of important legal debates are still grounded in von 
Savigny’s doctrine, these questions take on non-practical overtones, i.e., meta-
physical emphasis. 
The imminent presence of hermeneutics on all levels of a lawyer’s cognitive 
activity – in practical, dogmatic, and theoretical discourses – seems ultimately 
to confirm the hermeneutic claims of universal openness. One could get, at 
least, approximations to that claim in legal theory by looking at different types 
of legal discourses. There are (at least) three basic levels of cognition in legal 
discourses the converging cognitive structures of understanding, interpretation 
and application of law concern, as a rule, different entities of language (deontic 
sentences, rules or norms) and different levels of legal discourses. From this 
perspective, law is seen as a structure all elements of which are, on different 
levels, parallel to another and thus bears distinctive semantic law. Therefore, the 
semantic sense of legal concepts is basically a characterization of a given type 
of discourse. That is, at the level of interpretation, ‘the essence of law’ is no 
more than a certain linguistic expression. A starting-point of a lawyer’s work is, 
in principle, a pure linguistic interpretation, since the lawyer has to appeal to a 
language and different canons of interpretations, which either already exist and 
are universally accepted and applied in similar cases, or which have to be for-
mulated for the needs of an interpretative case. Secondly, as it is also assumed 
that discourses of justification pertain to justifying general legal norms in ab-
stracto and in light of the consequences, its observance may affect all concerned 
parties. Finally, discourses of application have a hermeneutic structure related 
to the justification of concrete judgments by making use of already justified 
29 
norms. The universal hermeneutic properties of specialized legal discourses 
explain why many references to the different hermeneutic theories can be found 
not only within the philosophy of law, but also within legal dogma. For exam-
ple, the principle of the hermeneutic circle (that refers to the idea that one’s 
understanding of the text as a whole is established by reference to the individual 
parts and one’s understanding of each individual part by reference to the whole) 
underlies the principle of systematic interpretation in law. Exactly the same 
hermeneutic circle is used in hermeneutic account of the processes of concreti-
zation and actualization of legal norms. Operating at the pragmatic level of legal 
discourses, legal hermeneutics becomes associated with “the hermeneutics of 
institutionalized situations of a dispute on conformity, i.e., a dispute about se-
mantic ‘synharmonization’ between legal rules, or between legal rules and le-
gally qualifiable fact” (Sharankova 2000: 40). Other particular elements of legal 
discourse (claims and facts) must be prepared in such a way that makes it possi-
ble to subsume the particular under universal norm (norm-application) in a form 
that is also not so different from Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic circle. This 
means that in any process of understanding the parts (typified behaviour, intent, 
and other elements of crime) must be understood in relation to the whole, just as 
the whole can only be understood in relation to its parts, in Schleiermacher’s 
words: “complete knowledge always involves an apparent circle, such that each 
part can be understood only out of the whole to which it belongs, and vice ver-
sa, all knowledge which is scientific must be constructed in this way” (Schlei-
ermacher 1986: 84). Each such circle of reasoning points backward to different 
modes of interpretation (historical, grammatical, etc.,) that requires knowledge 
of pertinent grammatical rules or general history. 
A charitable interpretation of modern doctrines of legal hermeneutics may 
include one important point that we may have already encountered in practical 
jurisprudence. Namely, a legal case alone does not have any complete meaning 
for the legal purposes: their meaning is the result of their entering into a rela-
tionship of reciprocal correspondence. Nevertheless, implementing hermeneutic 
methods frequently bring about judicial activism which maintains that the con-
tent of law is created by courts when they interpret certain provisions, for ex-
ample in criminal law, criminal liability should be set up every time in a con-
crete criminal provision. In 1968 Winfried Hassemer, a German legal scholar, 
carried out a notorious attempt of applying hermeneutics to the concerns of 
criminal law by offering the model of hermeneutic circle as the foothold to a 
model of adjudication in criminal trial (Hassemer 1968, 1986). The model pro-
posed by Hassemer immediately called for a huge dosage of critical responses 
accusing Hassemer in violating the basic principle of criminal law (nullum 
crimen nullum poena sine lege scripta) by allowing the judicial elements of 
law-making in criminal law. Another example of hermeneutic application may 
be discovered in discourses of adjudication in criminal law, in which analysis of 
offence follows hermeneutic spirals: from the elements of an offence to facts, 
from elements of an offence to the general conditions of liability, and from the 
general conditions of liability to fact (Tapani 2009: 137). 
30 
Nevertheless, before continuing with the description of legal hermeneutics 
proper, we wish to go back to Gadamer’s typology of hermeneutic approaches. 
Although Gadamer differentiated between several types of hermeneutics, he 
maintains that the problem of understanding and interpretation involves Anwen-
dung, application. Just as the judiciary, when interpreting the law, applies the 
text of the law and the text of legal histories to a specific case, whereby adjudi-
cation takes place, the reader of a text applies the text to his or her specific sit-
uation. In fact, Gadamer goes even further by claiming that interpretation only 
takes place in the act of application. Putting it in other words, one can say that 
without application, there is no interpretation. In other words: in legal decision-
making, the judge constructs a new virtual reference to the legal text in the 
world of actual litigation. Before that, the legal text only had a sense, that is, 
internal relations or semiotic structure. A given verdict states that it is accepta-
ble with a particular legal tradition to interpret a text of law as if it was referring 
to the case at hand. A proper account of legal decision-making needs, besides 
the synchronic view of the structure of legal texts, an analysis of the diachronic 
aspect (actualization of semiotic structure), through which it is possible to un-
derstand what is taking place in adjudication/application or in the legal world on 
the whole. 
In legal discourse, the conflict of interpretations is usually constrained by 
outer limits of presuppositions. As a rule, the greater the closure of such con-
strains the wider range of competing interpretations will incorporate different 
variants of the competing readings in themselves. It is time now to reiterate that, 
as said earlier, von Savigny’s classical hermeneutics was not constrained by 
strict rules of priority for interpretation in case of conflict. As we have shown 
above, in the absence of rules for interpretation in the system of law, a doctrinal 
interpretation allows the judge to engage with judicial activism and to make 
decisions by employing a kind of free legislative and law-creative activity. On 
the other hand, the strategy of judicial interpretation rests upon the principle of 
omnia sunt interpretanda – the principle that becomes a manifestation of a new 
dimension of judicial independence, namely a manifestation of independent 
authority over the meaning of legal text. We should also keep in mind that clas-
sical general hermeneutics being applied to the reading of legal texts will cer-
tainly retain some demarcation or ‘liminal space’ or ‘fundamental gap’ between 
intention and literal meaning, or between sentence meaning and speaker’s 
meaning, allowing judges to take in consideration highly problematic linguistic 
phenomena such as possible ambiguity of legal clause. Thus, although expect-
edly centred on the problem of proper understanding, Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
reject the reductionism of intentionalists by holding that it is not prescriptive 
that original intention of legislator is only one correct interpretation. For exam-
ple, in the Anglo-American legal systems, the precedents can be overruled if 
these precedents should come to be so clearly outdated that the state of Com-
mon Law at the time of precedents should have no more bearing. We can recall 
in this connection the famous hermeneutic maxim, which says that, in case of 
conflicts of interpretation, “the wider context decides” (Gadamer 1975: 272). 
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Particular elements are better interpreted as parts of a whole, and the better ex-
planation will be the one that includes more coherent elements within the pro-
jection of the meaning of the whole. Moreover, in contrast to the old popular 
‘intentionalist’ theories of legal interpretation, phenomenological hermeneutics 
maintains that hermeneutic ‘consciousness’ is itself that mode of being that is 
conscious of its own historical “being effected” (Gadamer 1992: 276). Any 
interpretations of the past, being based upon interpreters’ own prejudices and 
controlled by their own preconceptions, is as much a creature of the interpret-
ers’ own time and place as the phenomenon under investigation was of its own 
period in history. This is a perfect example of what is known as the historicity 
of understanding. Gadamer claimed that the process of understanding has not 
only a linguistic but also a historical context. Another important feature of Gad-
amer’s hermeneutics is its model of communication. In this model, every con-
versation creates a common language. This idea of a ‘common language’, gen-
erally characterized by Gadamer as a fusion of horizons (Gadamer 1992), is 
often misunderstood as a consensus. However, the ‘fusion of horizons’ (Hori-
zontverschmelzung) is not two people becoming one through the intersubjective 
elimination of difference. Instead, it is a dialectical play (dialogue) between 
one’s own horizon (understanding) and the horizon of the text (Other) one is 
trying to find a common ground, and thereby reaches a new understanding of 
the subject matter (die Sache) (Gadamer 1975: 269). This conclusion puts Gad-
amer into the company of the dialogical ideas of Bakhtin and his circle. Here, 
the underlying hermeneutic expectation is that the fixed verbal structure from 
the past is open into its future with regard to its topic or reference. 
It is obvious that the denial of historical context inevitably leads to the prob-
lem of anachronistic interpretations of the past (as it was in the case of the earli-
er doctrine of stare decisis in the common-law system). The solution to this 
problem was already justified by von Savigny’s canon of historical (genetic) 
interpretation of law that defined the historical element in interpretation exclu-
sively as regard for the condition of the legal rules referring to the point in ques-
tion at the time when the statute to be interpreted was adopted. Even now, when 
in many modern legal theories the preparatory works and the circumstances of 
the treaty’s conclusion have come to be viewed only supplementary means of 
interpretation, the recourse to the so-called travaux préparatoires plays an im-
portant role for the interpretation of international conventions. 
Anticipating the possible objections to the universality of hermeneutic ap-
proach, it must be clarified that ostensible universality cannot provide reliable 
solutions to all problems of legal interpretations. Therefore, an additional layer 
of certain constraints imposed on hermeneutics’ application is highly desirable. 
One such a constraint stems from the field of text semantics, which holds as 
granted that a vague clause could be described as having at the same time two 
or even more different ‘meanings’, and it is very possible that none of them is 
so called ‘intended’ meaning (Iser 2000: 5–6). The last observation points to the 
fact that a strictly understood linguistic interpretation could only solve some of 
minor legal problems, which concern an explanation of ambiguity, or a vague 
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clause sentence preceding the question of law or deciding which meaning is 
intended one. The ambiguity in law presents a serious problem, because in case 
of ambiguity more than one interpretation is possible. Sometimes, in ambiguous 
cases the ‘legal’ issues may be interpreted by appealing to rhetorical categories. 
In the case of scriptum et voluntas, there are two different stories about the crea-
tion of the same text. The second one (contrariae leges) describes a contradic-
tion concerning the relation (correspondence) of the ‘facts’-narrative to two 
competing narratives (in different texts). In the first case of ambiguitas, the 
same contradiction emerges between two readings of two equally plausible nar-
ratives based on the same text. The divergent points in interpretation could be 
efficiently handled with help of the rhetorical category of collectio that refers to 
the contradiction about the possibility of the correspondence of the ‘facts’ to 
any legal text (Kathy 2005). The familiar opposition between scriptum and vol-
untas, where the fundamental legal discrepancy is between intention and action 
might be also extended to legal actions. 
Another problem is intrinsically related to the topic of authorial intention in 
legal texts, when the author’s intention appears to be subverted by the referen-
tial structure: “whether we speak of the framers’ intention or legislative intent, a 
legal text defies any monolithic reading” (Milovanovic 1992: 119). To be sure, 
the generalization of meaning in legal discourses is far from being a simple 
hermeneutic model. This matter, in its turn, offers substantive weight to deliber-
ate constructivism, in which interpretation provided by any legal subject is as 
good as original meaning invested into legal text by its author(s). Deliberate 
constructivism asserts that when we are in the process of interpreting the prior 
object, besides the prior object and its interpretation there is a third object the 
interpretation brings into existence. The contention between law and its inter-
pretation is illustrated by clarifying the relation between intention and action, 
and the use of a fictional tool for assessing intention in the mind of the accused 
in order to establish intent and link it to a specific action. In contrast to inten-
tionalism, constructivism also takes for granted that in discursive practices the 
ways in which legal meanings are generated, really do matter. In theory, legal 
discourse of court trials can be represented as proceeding from a mutual inter-
dependence between legislative discourse consisting of performative, normative 
rules, and a referential ideological discourse. This nuanced model could be ac-
cepted but with certain reservations, for it only partly succeeds in showing how 
legal discourse of trial is reliant on participants’ commitment to hermeneutic 
‘readings’ of author’s intention. 
In reality, legal trials are fought not only with regard to facts, but also with 
regard to words (questions of law and their interpretations): the issue is not only 
if certain behaviour happened (a fact), but also if that behaviour is illegal, if the 
law prohibits it. Thus, in a court of law, unconstrained conflict is transformed 
into the assault of words. The parties in litigation are interested not as much in 
understanding what the legislator (‘the author’) really wanted to say, but in 
winning the case by using specific rhetorical and linguistic skills. Thus, one 
must accept that in legal reality, certain normative constraints on hermeneutic 
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rules and canons of interpretation are necessary for making sense of law. A 
theory of interpretation should preserve. In other words, besides the constraints 
imposed by legal actors on situation they wished to address, there are also con-
straints that impose themselves on actors without concern for what actors 
meant. We need to devote more attention to those constraints on hermeneutic 
practice of constructivist readings of law designed to ensure the stability that 
differentiate legal and moral reasoning (Goodrich 1996; Perelman, 1980). In 
this context, we could describe hermeneutic rules or canons as instruments of 
attaining certain goal that aims not at directing the will of the receivers, but at 
indicating to them that their will is conditioned (Poggi 2011). For example, 
François Gény goes on to say that the main acknowledged constraint on the 
interpreter is the written law, and this exerts the primary authoritative source 
when it exists: “statute as such is the expression of the authority of a man or a 
group of men, commensurate with their intelligence” (Gény 1963: 565). In other 
words, even though a statute carries forward the intention of its authors, and the 
situations which it was presumed to govern (and therefore no statute becomes 
an independent entity separate from the thought of its author), the process of 
legal hermeneutics must be regarded as a continuation of an idea, a human 
thought, a question, posed in the form of a statement, or indication, by the ex-
presser to a respondent. So the measure of a written law or rule is not an ab-
stract one, but whether it succeeds as communication in the context in which it 
operates. There will always be an irreducible element of ambiguity in any 
communication, arising from both the inherent ambiguity of words and gram-
mar and the inability to make general statements in advance that will always be 
applicable to every possible combination of facts that might arise. That is why 
every legal system has a significant amount of arbitrary rules (Kelsen 1967), let 
alone frames of interpretations, which are applicable to cases of ambiguities 
(Jackson 1985: 267). Any interpretation that violates those rules is no longer 
deemed to be a legally valid interpretation in a court of law. The hope of the 
lawgiver is that the law-applying body is well aware of those rules and uses 
them to best advantage in communication: for the scope of our analysis it is 
sufficient to say that some of those rules of interpretation are to various extent 
recognized, formalized and even stipulated expressis verbis in the international 
treaties throughout the world.  
For example, in order to avoid the international repercussions and to ensure 
the efficiency of international law it is advised to implement recommended 
methodology of interpretation proposed in the Vienna Convention of 1986 Arti-
cle 31, § 1 of the Vienna Convention stipulates that „a treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.9 Only 
when the proposed method leads to ambiguous results, we can have recourse to 
                                                          
9  1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Orga-
nizations or between International Organizations.1968 VCLT-IO.25 ILM 543 (1986) / Doc. 
A/CONF.129/15.21 March 1986, Vienna 
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supplementary means of interpretation. On the other hand, the CJEU (EU Court 
of Justice) has never explicitly referred to the Vienna Convention, and it is gen-
erally assumed that the CJEU employs the textual method of interpretation10; 
however, the open-ended nature of EU law allows disregarding the textual 
wordings by accepting teleological and contextual interpretations. It appears 
probable that interpretation methods of jurisprudence are prone to indulging in 
same naïve hermeneutic assumptions. The authors of so called ‘rules of inter-
pretation’, unlike hermeneutics, attempt to draw a clear hierarchy of interpreta-
tive methods, but in doing so they disregard the difference between the empiri-
cal reading process and the surprises of text as meaning of any particular text is 
theoretically inexhaustible. We may observe at this point that the thrust of rules 
of interpretation is paralyzed when it comes to the question of multiple meaning 
of the same text. The kind of hermeneutic approach favoured in international 
law is not a comprehensive perspective that embraces all the interpretative ap-
proaches, but rather a very definite and limited activity, which privileges univo-
cal meanings of legal texts. Far from discussing whether hermeneutic canon of 
interpretations and legal rules of interpretations are obscure, dogmatic or prob-
lematic, we are going to confront them with the fundamental thesis of Derrida’s 
deconstruction with which we ultimately will embark on a critique of herme-
neutic theories. In our treatment of conflict, deconstruction proves to be more 
promising, since it explicitly connects ‘different’ (difference) to ‘differend’ 
(conflict) (Fleerackers 2008: 28). 
 
 
3.3. The Concept of Conflict in the Project  
of Deconstruction 
Although hermeneutics and deconstruction share much in common, juridical 
nihilism, so noticeable in different ‘deconstructive’ renditions of jurisprudence 
(most notably, in Critical Legal Studies) offers a counter approach to the delib-
erate constructivism of hermeneutics. While hermeneutics asserts that the es-
sence of hermeneutic approach is exemplified by legal theories of interpretation, 
deconstruction aims at denouncing and deconstructing those concepts in its 
attempts to emancipate meaning that the legal methods have silenced (Goodrich 
1990). The crux of difference between those two currents of thought is that 
hermeneutics celebrate values of truth and meaning, while deconstruction re-
futes them as metaphysical entities. Providing interesting insights into the pro-
cess of legal interpretation and the issues of conflict in law, deconstruction de-
bilitated the tenets of formalism in legal theory and subsequently gained curren-
cy in the modern jurisprudence. More important is that the deconstructive juris-
prudence, with its inherent nihilistic tendencies, implies that it is always neces-
sary to dissolve law into a variety of readings pertaining to relations between 
individuals, who engage in legal discourse, participate in the discovery of the 
                                                          
10  See discussion in Senden (2011). 
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multiplicity of juridical thought. Another major conclusion of deconstructive 
jurisprudence is that in discursive structures of law truth-claims would emerge 
as provisional claims. Given that conclusion, it is very appropriate to introduce 
the concept of ‘infinite deferral’ or ‘infinite drift’ of meanings, which goes hand 
in hand with disassembling of text (Derrida 1978: 268). Derrida’s theory entails 
strong anti-formalist appraisal by claiming that construction of meaning in law 
and its evaluation are essentially devoid of foundation and the legal text has no 
stable meaning. The task of deconstruction is to show not that texts are neces-
sarily meaningless, but that they are open to multiple conflicting meanings. This 
characteristic assumption of discourse can be succinctly restated for specific 
legal texts: when reading legal texts one may enthuse about the rich hermeneu-
tic potential of legal texts, it is because they leave meaning radically open rather 
than because they close it down prematurely. Since the tension between herme-
neutics and deconstruction is un-decidable, the reader retains a commanding 
position in the process of interpretation despite the author’s assumptions of 
hermeneutic control because it is the reader who is called upon and implored to 
approve the author’s own interpretation. A text is an iterating object and can be 
repeated, so its meaning can be argued. Far from providing means of fixing 
meaning, deconstructive reading ensures that meaning is produced, in process, 
but never stable or unitary. In this conception, interpretation is a project, which 
can never be completed. Here, deconstruction echoes the message of philosoph-
ical hermeneutics: “seeking new teachings, hermeneutics incessantly returns 
towards verses which have already been interpreted, but which are inexhausti-
ble” (Lévinas 1982: 7). 
Let us proceed with discussing the concept of meaning in deconstruction: 
deconstruction assumes that whatever closure is reached in legal interpretation, 
it is due to something outside the text, because it is not an original meaning 
which is vested in a text, but rather a reminiscent of meaning we are able to 
trace. It should be mentioned that the position held by followers of deconstruc-
tion has received justified criticism. Derrida’s position is the main target of 
Eco’s criticism (Eco 1990: 35–36) when he writes that certain ‘modern interpre-
tive theories of deconstruction’ have gone too far in allowing the reader to blur 
intentio operis granting interpreter with unconstrained opportunity to reflect 
upon a text (Eco 1990: 36). The interpretative resources are limited and the 
limits of interpretation are articulated by intervention of common sense and 
refined restatements of semiotic concepts, like Peircean concept of unlimited 
semiosis. Even if semiotics permits the establishment of theoretically unlimited 
modes of interpretation, the movement among them must obey the congruent 
conditions of interpretative economy. In order to comply with the demands of 
interpretative economy, the perfect hermeneutic act must realign three different 
types of intention – the intention of author, that one of the text and that one of 
the reader. Eco’s criticism is justified when we deal with relatively autonomous 
sphere of linguistic production in the juridical structure. In this respect, decon-
struction is clearly at variance with the real legal practice. Another aspect of 
criticism is also expected. Rather than seeing the construction of meaning in law 
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as ‘an infinite drift of meanings’, the legal practice (especially that one of high-
er courts) binds specific legal meaning to signifiers and transforms elements 
with ‘floating connotations’ of natural language into the elements of legal dis-
course not only bearing a specific fixed legal monosemic meaning, but also 
capable of producing it. To a surprising degree this conception has become 
widespread in Greimas’ version of legal semiotics, where law is seen as a form 
of symbolic power of naming that constitute the monosemic legal objects, the 
constitution of such semiotic objects is accomplished either through the consti-
tutive act of naming objects in legislative discourse or through the ascribing the 
precise (more static and decontextualized) meaning to them by the higher 
courts. There is also a difference between sense relations within legal discourse 
and those that exist in ordinary language. Although ordinary language includes 
marked binary oppositions, whose marked term (according to the context) might 
or might not include unmarked term (‘man’ may be used to include ‘woman’), 
in the legal lexicon the use of marked oppositions with such ‘inclusionary’ 
meanings is so highly discouraged that “the adoption of such ‘inclusionary 
meanings’ within the legal lexicon was thought to require statutory enactment” 
(Jackson 1995: 25). It is not surprising that this semiotic manoeuvre leads Jack-
son from asserting the total lack of fixed meaning in binary oppositions to the 
equally shocking claim of asserting the total hegemony of the author (the legis-
lator) over legal text. 
Without downplaying the peculiarities of legal discourses we may argue that 
under certain circumstances the deployment of deconstructive practice in law 
could pay off. Let us suppose, that there are many marked binary oppositions in 
legal discourse. Then, sooner or later, we’ll have to deal with an instance of 
reversal of categories in binary oppositions by revealing the implied tension in 
reversal of categories of binary oppositions; one can bring forth the vision of 
moral and legal obligation which is entirely different from that one of legal 
dogmatic. The implications of Derrida’s theory of interpretation which goes 
beyond the traditional hermeneutic canons and semantic theories can be also 
extended to constitutional interpretation. Indeed, in constitutional interpretation, 
deconstructive method of interpretation would have undisputable advantages 
over more conventional hermeneutic and semantic methods for one obvious 
reason. Interpretation which is deprived of deconstructive elements tends to 
ignore or even neutralize law’s antinomies and makes of constitutional interpre-
tation simply a circular and self-legitimating practice that seeks to avoid a con-
flict. Drawing on our considerations of deconstruction, we could assert that the 
deconstructionist interpretation of constitution is somewhat different for it is 
mainly concerned with the dissemination of the constitution by tracing the re-
petitive references of constitution to other textual events and to other texts (such 
as international treaties etc.). Deconstructive interpretation aspires to transcend 
the image of constitution as a closed system. The process of tracing references 
of repetition beyond the constitution is the continuous process of recovery of 
hidden legal meanings. In the wake of Derrida, we would say that the tracing of 
the repetition takes place in on those zones in the text of metaphysics where 
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difference’s movement from appearance to disappearance is most readily dis-
cernible, signifies that this thought has a further sense beyond that of a bare 
negation of any form of presence of the origin. What a concept of trace of con-
stitution means for deconstructionists, quite simply, is that every sign refers to 
all the signs from which it is differentiable. 
With all possible cautions, we could assert that the examined process of de-
construction (or rather, revealing difference in Derrida’s terminology), which 
shows the determination of Being as Presence (Derrida 1982: 21) serves in law 
a specific purpose enabling the ‘silenced others’ to tell their ‘tale’. One of the 
essential turns which deconstruction takes here is that it explains how law re-
flects social visions by privileging of particular conceptions of human nature or 
particular human groups. When one attempts to deconstruct legal principles, 
one can find oneself in the odd position of having to articulate the ideological 
reasoning that involves privileging of certain groups (Balkin 1987). In our view, 
this fascinating and challenging observation needs to be set in a proper perspec-
tive and clarified by using a practical example. For the purposes of evaluation, 
we are going to offer a fine deconstructionist reading of a famous case taken 
from the judicial practice of The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. In 
1968, The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany affirmed the possibility of 
revoking the legal validity of Nazi legal provisions, if they were violating the 
fundamental concepts of law. From the deconstructionist perspective, in such 
cases of violating the principles of natural law, the revocation of Nazi legal 
provisions by Constitutional Court signalled a specific way of expressing a dif-
ferend (conflict) between requirements of natural law and provisions of positive 
law that cannot be accepted according to natural law. Here, the differend is un-
derstood as a case of a conflict between two parties, which cannot be equitably 
resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments; in such a 
case it is important to note how the resolution takes place (Lyotard 1988). At 
first sight, Lyotard’s explanation of differend appears to be a misty one. For 
Lyotard, it is evident that illusionary ‘resolution’ of the conflict between two 
incommensurable languages in terms of judgments, is written in the idiolect of 
one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that 
idiolect. In principle, it is impossible to avoid conflicts, because differend is 
signalled by the inability to be heard. The one who lodges a complaint is heard, 
but the one who is a victim and who is, perhaps, the same one, is reduced to 
silence (Lyotard 1988: 10). Another related problem here is that in legal com-
munication of differend, where both the addresser of norms and the addressee 
are the same persons belonging to the same group. Indeed, by surveying the 
legal establishment’s accommodation and application of discriminatory laws in 
Nazi Germany, we can observe that Nazis made laws without reference to any-
one except themselves. 
A more radical deconstructionist account of law’s binary oppositions has 
been offered by Paul de Man (de Man 1986). De Man shares with Derrida a 
tendency to operate on a level of interpretation which does not exclude either 
the determinacy of literal meaning or that of authorial intention. What allows 
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the legal text to proliferate is that a legal text appears to contain tensions within 
its structure, such as negating of the individuality of rights or marking the indif-
ference of legal text with regard to its referential meaning (Necati 1997). With a 
growing rejection of the assumptions underpinning formalist theories of mean-
ing, the problem of settled meaning is increasingly perceived from many angles: 
some scholars deny the very existence of the genuine literal meaning, which 
they equated with the combination of the semic cores of the words used in the 
utterance (Searle 1979, Wilensky 1989). They argue that the literal meaning of 
a sentence is the meaning which the speaker attributes to a sentence in a normal 
situation. Taking this argument to a logical extreme, we would claim that the 
interpretative determinacy of literal meaning is the linchpin of a linguistically 
based model created by legal philosopher Hart. Accepting the inability of posi-
tivism (especially that one of Austin’s speech acts) to break the semiotic code of 
legal discourse, Hart refuted a classical version of legal positivism by suggest-
ing that legal communication is possible when the communicated legal concepts 
have a semantic hard core of settled meaning of standard instances, where there 
is no doubt about the meaning of words, surrounded by the ‘penumbra of uncer-
tainty’ (Hart 1961: 12). Disagreements usually do arise in the penumbral area, 
but even these disagreements must themselves have a point of reference given 
by the settled meaning. So much for this type of the settled meaning, which 
requires a hearer to make recourse to extra-linguistic experience; the latter, in its 
own turn, must be presented in such a way as to be intelligible to a hearer. In 
order to reach an interpretation, hearers would need to delve into semantic dis-
tinctions that conflate under the very general terms of ‘legal’ and ‘vernacular’ 
meanings of legal concepts. Hence, Hart’s theory of legal meanings appears to 
be consentient with traditional hermeneutics at most of its critical moments. But 
more importantly for our present purposes, the widespread acceptance of Hart’s 
“hard core of the settled meanings” raised the interest in Aristotle’s rhetoric 
(topics) - Aristotelian classical notion of endoxa (an argument from common 
beliefs, the common sense opinions, the conceptions of general public), which 
is coming here to be viewed as something similar to rhetorical topoi. As such, 
the topic of endoxa has a tremendous relevance in our discussion of literal 
meaning, as the literal meaning of a sentence only has application relative to a 
set of contextual or background assumptions (Aristotle’s doxa, an opinion upon 
which many in broad accord within a given context), improving thereby the 
reliability of interpretation. This conclusion was accepted even by Searle, who, 
as a rule, rejects equating ‘literal meaning’ with ‘zero or null context: “for a 
large class of sentences there is no such thing as the zero or null context for the 
interpretation of sentences, and that as far as our semantic competence is con-
cerned we understand the meaning of such sentences only against a set of back-
ground assumptions about the contexts in which the sentence could be appropri-
ately uttered” (Searle 1961: 207). However, one could claim that the very exist-
ence of ‘commonly accepted set of assumptions’ is highly problematic, because 
the frequent juxtaposition of text and ‘common assumptions’ related to a partic-
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ular discourse enormously contributes to different layers of meaning, and no 
shared opinions exist in the social setting, where legal discourse takes place. 
Still, in spite of the apparent terminological difficulties, legal canons of in-
terpretation constantly make reference to the concept of literal meaning, and so 
do legal judgments. The plain meaning rules says that if the meaning of a legis-
lative text is plain, the court may not interpret it but must simply apply it as 
written. Given that the resources of interpretation in judicial cases are usually 
limited, it is only when there is an ambiguity in a text; the court may appeal to 
the rules and techniques of interpretation. The rule itself is rather simplistic, 
because there is no clearly articulated distinction between a plain text and a text 
whose meaning is not plain: no text is plain until it is interpreted. However, a 
plain meaning approach will not extend to very debate just as it will not depend 
on a fixed translation of hermeneutic principles of the plain meaning in histori-
cal context. The seemingly simplistic method in its most commonly stated form 
holds that when there is a conflict between ‘what is said’ in the written instru-
ment and what is intended, judges tend to base their decision on the literal 
meaning, which is understood as the grammatical and ordinary sense of the 
word. However one may ask how the plain/the literal meaning are established in 
legal discourses. The most common tactic that courts employ when having dif-
ficulties with establishing of the literal meaning of an ordinary word is to con-
sult a dictionary (for example, Black’s Law Dictionary). The solution is far 
from perfection: it is clear that dictionaries may contain misleading information 
that even technical dictionaries that have misleading information and by virtue 
of this fact this sorts of plain and ordinary meaning based on a dictionary may 
well be refuted or even misused for particular rhetorical or ideological reasons. 
A particular reading of the rule can be presented as the accepted standard read-
ing, although other interpretations of the rule are possible from a legal point of 




4. SUMMARIES OF PUBLISHED ARTICLES 
4.1. Charles Sanders Peirce,  
a Mastermind of (Legal) Arguments [Article I] 
The similarity in the patterns of inquiry between legal argumentation and 
semiotics raises the question of how we explain it. Someone might be tempted 
to posit an existence of a sort of universal methodology, but it is more 
productive to explain the similarity as a result of sharing the same universal 
epistemological and phenomenological perspectives between the process of 
legal reasoning and semiotic inquiry. The article is inspired by Peirce’s idea that 
all reasoning must be necessarily in signs: every act of reasoning/ 
argumentation/scientific inquiry is a sign process, leading to ‘the growth of 
knowledge’. In this article, we illustrated the universal nature of law by 
phenomenologically considering semiotic constituents (phenomenological 
modes of Quality, Object and General Regularity) of the most fundamental and 
generic type of sign – Argument. The starting-point in application of Peirce’s 
ideas to legal argumentation is the universalizing nature of some fundamental 
rules of practical discourse, in our case, fundamental rules of legal reasoning. 
The recovery of the universalizing semiotic nature of legal reasoning disguised 
beneath the surface of scientific and political interpretation of law opens an 
astonishing new perspectives for legal semioticians eager to explore the 
methods of legal argumnetation. It does not necessarily change the traditional 
rules of reasoning. What it changes is the pattern of understanding and the focus 
of our attention, which shifts inexorably towards a study of sign processes in 
legal reasoning. This is the approach that highlights the presence of the 
unavoidable element of Speculative Grammar conjoing juridical logic and the 
rhetorics of law within the process of the evolution of legal thought and the 
growth of legal knowledge. 
The relevance of this approach to jurisprudence is less obvious, since very 
few approaches deriving from semiotics could ever be directly testable in a 
legal context. Nevertheless, in our analysis we have drawn special attention to 
the limitations of traditional expanatory models of legal argumentation. The 
main weakness of those approaches is thar they are still strongly affected by 
either the dialectical (logical) perspective or the rhetorical perspective on 
argumentation. By complementing traditional models of legal argumentation 
with Peirce’s approach, it allowed us to conduct a better synthesis of rhetorical 




4.2. On Relationships Between the Logic of Law,  
Legal Positivism and Semiotics of Law [Article II] 
While the previous article has already touched upon the topic of realtionships 
between logic of law, science of positive law and legal semiotics, the second 
article tackles the question of reciprocal relationships between the logic of law, 
positive law, and legal semiotics. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, in observing 
the backwardness of legal positivism in explaining the evolution of society, 
legal theory saw a progressive increase in the number of perspectives aimed at 
understanding law. Still, the topic of relationships between logic, science of 
positive law and semiotics has been a troublesome one, being an object of much 
philosophical debate in the last century. Because of the complexity of the 
discussed topic, in our second article we didn’t pursue a goal of providing a 
comprehensive account of different theoretical perspectives within the modern 
jurisprudence. Instead, our analysis was committed to another idea that crucial 
aspects of positivist science of law, logical studies of law and legal semiotics 
can be effectively addressed in a comparative manner designed to trace the 
similarities or the differences between these paradigms of legal research. Thus, 
the aim of this paper was to detect traces of methodological differences and 
similarities between logic, positivism and semiotics. The differences/similarities 
in the approaches worked themselves out in terms of differences/similarities in 
the way these approaches understand law itself. At the center of logical analysis 
is the proof of logical connections between the norms of law. For scholars of the 
positivist science of law, who in this regard follow philosophical positivism, the 
concept of law is presented only as a layer of meta-language that separates law 
from politics. And, however, we should not leave the topic of relationships be-
tween logic, positive science of law and semiotics without mentioning the inter-
esting speculation of Bernard S. Jackson, according to whom (Jackson 1990), 
legal semiotics is 1) a radical criticism of legal positivism, even if it still privi-
leges the essentialist view of language, and 2) able to mediate critically between 
legal realism and legal positivism by clarifying the interrelations between sense 
and meaning. 
In our opinion, the main conclusion of this article is that the limits of legal 
semiotics are always relational to law, and its object of inquiry could only be 
defined in relation to legal positivism and logical studies of law. Secondly, we 
argued for a proper position for legal semiotics in between legal positivism and 
legal logic: the differences between legal positivism, legal logic and legal se-
miotics are best captured in the issue of referent.  
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4.3. The Semiotic Model of Legal Reasoning [Article III] 
In our third article, another entry into the issue of reciprocal connections of  the 
science of posittive law with legal logic and semiotics brings us to grips wth the 
very complicated topic of legal argumentation. Though the field of 'legal 
argumentation ' is not as crowded as those fields that deal with other aspects of 
practical legal discourse, it has attracted more and more interest over the last 
years. The focus of this paper is on semiotic models of legal argumentation and 
legal discourse. Whether or not a particular model of legal reasoning can be 
spelled out so as to handle difficulties, we assumed that any adequate theory of 
legal reasoning would have to tackle what virtually all say is the problem - that 
many argumentation theories describe models which are characterized by 
abstract rules of argumentation rather than laying out a credible acccount of 
how arguments are constructed. Hence, rather than repeating thorough literature 
reviews that have appeared elsewhere, we proceeded from the theoretical 
framework for a semiotic theory of legal argumentation first introduced in our 
earlier papers. In this article, this theoretical approach we amended by wedding 
traditional formal account of argumentation in jurisprudence to a semiotic ac-
count of argumentation and this combination yields a reliable account of the 
conditions under which legal actors produce legal arguments. Such a juridical 
cum semiotic account of legal reasoning provides, as we contended, a plausible 
theory of the creation of meaningful legal arguments within legal discourse. 
The analysis of different models of legal discourse also aims to provide in-
sight into the relationship between rhetoric and semiotics within the holistic 
semiotic framework of legal reasoning. In order to compare the discursive struc-
tures emanating from existing types of rhetorical discourse of law to those cre-
ated by logical models, it is necessary to develop a sophisticated methodology 
that mimics and analyzes on a deeper level of coherence in the structure of legal 
discourse. First of all, by examining the assumptions necessary to generate such 
a methodology, we have clarified the relationships between semiotic, rhetorical 
and logical images of legal discourse. Then, in order to eliminate discrepancies, 
we have implemented the model of ‘creolization’ of two distinct metalanguages, 
that inevitably leads to the reducing of those distinctions and that may have far-
reaching consequences for the further studies of legal argumentation. 
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4.4. The Case of Lauris Kaplinski:  
A Guide to a Semiotic Reading of Incitement of  
Hatred in Modern Criminal Justice [Article IV] 
In the next (the fourth) component article of our dissertation, we took our point 
of departure in the legal meaning making process as a semiotic activity of indi-
viduals participating in legal discourse. The fourth article is very different from 
the rest of the articles included herein: in this article we concerned ourselves 
with practical issues for the participants in particular types of legal discourse 
(criminal trials) rather than with semiotic ‘modeling’. It goes without saying 
that it is a characteristic of some types of legal discourse, particularly judicial, 
that they purport to provide an account of their own production, with special 
emphasis on interaction and the local accomplishment of meaning in the trial. 
Since the construction of an overall semiotic model of law requires considera-
tion of the semiotic relationship between juridical argumentation and construc-
tion of the legal subject through the different stages of legal communication. 
Such a semiotic relationship has been held forth as manifesting the specificity 
of legal communication. We took a criminal trial to be a good illustration of this 
specificity – indeed criminal justice is the area of law where we are closest to an 
overview of the semiotic processes through a succession of organizational con-
texts. We start with the first call to the police and conclude with the criminal 
trial or appeal. The main stages in the process may be characterized as (police) 
investigation, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by public officials, and the 
trial. The attention of legal philosophers and semioticians alike has been di-
rected primarily towards this last. However, it is important to draw attention 
also to the earlier stages, and to the possibilities which exist of fitting them 
within a single semiotic framework of analysis. In our article, the focus varies 
according to specific interests, i.e., we started with an investigation of the legal 
meaning process from a point of view of narrative semiotics (semio-narrative 
approach), and then we shifted our focus from discussion of the theoretical 
model to the application of this model in Kaplinski’s case. However, it is im-
portant to draw attention also to the earlier stages, and to the possibilities which 
exist of fitting them within a single semiotic framework of analysis. The semio-
narrative approach makes it possible to understand the evaluation as a cognitive 
operation underlying the judge’s argumentation, the construction of the legal 
subject and the indication of judicial stance in legal cases. Another advantage of 
legal semiotics over more traditional positivist accounts of legal discourses is 
that semiotics pays more attention to what is conveyed by messages and on how 
these messages (signs) are put together in legal discourse, while traditional post-
positivist accounts of law focuses more on the rational reasons (rational dis-





4.5. The Splendors and Miseries  
of Constitutional Reasoning in Times of Global Crisis:  
A Critical Look from the Realist Perspectives of Semiotics 
[Article V] 
In looking over different critical responses, we have seen an argument raised by 
media and legal scholars, according to which courts' capitulation before the 
power of financial markets in the EMS rulings represents ‘a sign of judicial 
crisis’ that marks the weakness of modern European jurisprudence. In light of 
their importance, we undertake a preliminary semiotic analysis of the ESM rul-
ings of the Estonian National Court, the German Constitutional Court, and in 
the European Court of Justice. Our analysis aims at discerning the crucial as-
pects of those rulings is performed on the basis of different semiotic methodol-
ogies combined with the refined ideas of the Scandinavian analytical school of 
the doctrinal study of law. In traditional legal studies there seems to be a taken 
for granted assumption that there is one analytical way to dissect judicial rea-
soning of the supreme courts. But the matter turns out on closer examination to 
be more complicated. It is argued in our paper that the manner of reading the 
constitutional reasoning needs to be congruent with particular methodologies of 
scientific inquiry. By employing different semiotic theories We have presented 
an applied semiotic method for analysing the manner, in which judges of consti-
tutional courts have reviewed the ESM treaty (the European Stability Mecha-
nism Treaty) and subsequently constructed ‘European’ meaning of ‘stability 
community’. This ‘European’ meaning was constructed in the sense of setting 
forth standards that are commensurate to the status and the function of the Un-
ion, without a need of complying with specific ‘German’ meanings as regards 
the foundational principles of Germany’s constitutional order. The Courts did so 
by referring to a very specific ‘European’ value, which is defined in terms of its 
design as a stability union, that the monetary union has to date been given under 
the Treaties.  In our article we claimed that the specific European value of sta-
bility is nothing else than a zero sign or zero degree, that is, the absence of an 
explicit signifier which functions by itself as a signifier.  
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5. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
5.1. Conflict in Legal Argumentation  
as a Semiotic Device 
In the previous sections of our thesis, as well as in published papers, we argued 
that the cultural criticism of law might be seen as an auxiliary aspect of the 
hermeneutic/deconstructionist reading of law, albeit the aspect well worth ex-
ploring. Faced with positivist theories of law, hermeneutics and deconstructions 
have no qualms about putting into play the argument more directly linked to the 
relevance of reading regarding legal meaning, in the same manner a similar 
point could be made from the perspective of semiotics, from which we can ob-
tain many more insights related to the methods of the conflict resolutions. It is 
also true that the major difference is that in semiotic analyses we set the higher 
significance to conflict as a critical concern for contemporary theories of law 
and legal reasoning. Basically, rather than accessing legal positivism according 
to the litmus test of its methods, it behoves us to make sure whether legal theo-
ries can adequately deal with the concept of conflict, or these theories are lim-
ited by intellectual constraints and professional interests which reduce the pos-
sibilities of meaningful consensus. What we are insistent about is that the prac-
tices and presuppositions of neo-liberal legalism (recently classified by Mac-
Cormick as ‘post-positivism’ (MacCormick 2007)) should be re-considered 
from the new critical perspective. 
However, for the purposes of our article, it is sufficient to merely make note 
of legal positivism. We argue that the new trend of positivism exemplified in 
writings of such prominent legal scholars as Ronald Dworkin, Neil MacCor-
mick and Robert Alexy must be challenged as failing to live up to the aspira-
tions of the complexity of legal reasoning. Although both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ ver-
sions of positivist theory are rather generic labels used to refer to a lot of legal 
theories whose common place consists in barely sketched critical approaches to 
legal matters, some of its forms (MacCormick’s ‘institutional theory of law’ 
(MacCormick 2007) etc.,) are continuing to permeate the law with its interpreta-
tive/argumentative manipulations. Lastly, genuine forms of ‘pure’ positivism 
are almost as rare in recent jurisprudence as it was popular in the middle of the 
20th century. In the ‘hard’ version of positivism, legal positivists accepted inter-
pretative presuppositions as some sort of theoretical foundation for evaluating 
the acceptability of interpretations. As we can observe in the case of ‘soft’ legal 
positivism, in justifying its highly questionable claims it has no other choice but 
to resorting to universal ideal rules of practical rational discourse. The latter 
ones, either do not exist at all, or appear to be so conventional that they have 
only minimal influence on the actual discursive activity. The main contribution 
of so-called ‘post-positivism’ is that it re-introduces tenets of natural law by 
conveying opposition theory to established positivistic theories of law. General-
ly speaking, post-positivist critique concerns the well-known dichotomy that 
implicitly separates ‘theories of law’ from ‘theories of adjudication’. A key 
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aspect of this post-positivist tackling with theory of adjudication has stemmed 
from Dworkin’s assumptions, according to which legal norms are defined by 
social reality (Müller 1977: 75). 
There have always been critical voices against separating pragmatics of law 
(‘justification’) from semantics of law (‘theory of law’) and the response which 
post-positivism chooses, appears to be particularly resonant with Alexy’s ideas. 
Without going into philosophical intricacies, Alexy made it possible to revital-
ize a wide range of different traditions – from British and American analytical 
philosophy, Perelman’s studies in rhetoric, and Habermas’ theory of discourse 
and German tradition of hermeneutics. Making use of this rich synthesis, Alexy, 
in his attempt to avoid the basic dilemma of legal reasoning, introduced a new 
procedural approach to the topic of legal justification, and established the basic 
discursive principles to which reasonable appeal may be made in order to justify 
decisions of any sort (MacCormick 1983: 7). Notice that Alexy is talking about 
a certain tension in positive law without trying to specify, whether he is talking 
about conflict of interpretation or about a principle of authority, as opposed to 
substantive reasons (Alexy 1989). The stance of basic discursive rules has been 
explicitly expressed in the dispute between Raz and Alexy on the topic of con-
flict of laws. According to Alexy any discursive constraints appear to be justi-
fied only if one participant of discourse has convinced its proponent in a dia-
logue that justifies certain constraints in cases of conflict. Alexy’s account of 
rational justification has been subject of extensive academic debate, with the 
scholars raising questions ranging from whether an account of justification can 
be offered solely in terms of tension between substantive reasons and the au-
thority. Nothing just said is likely to trouble Alexy’s main proponent Joseph 
Raz, who expressly tackles the issue of Conflict of Laws in his commitment to 
critique of Alexy’s conceptions. He argued that Alexy’s argument of the inevi-
table presence of the principles of conflict resolution on in all legal systems is 
invalid for it concludes that the law of a country includes principles from the 
sole premise that the courts are required, by law, to apply principles. However, 
the courts of Britain are required by law to apply standards of foreign law, and 
many others which are not parts of the law of the land in Britain (Raz 2007). 
Raz concludes that external norms may be ‘adopted’ by a positive legal system 
if the external norms belong to another normative system practiced by its norm‐
subjects and which are recognized where the system intends to respect the way 
that the community regulates its activities, or those are norms which were made 
by or with the consent of their norm‐subjects by the use of powers conferred on 
them by the system in order to enable such individuals to arrange their own 
affairs. 
Raz’s scepticism aside, we deem a mere simplistic post-positivist generaliza-
tion of legal reasoning to be unsatisfactory: although Alexy goes to great 
lengths to elaborate an account of rational argumentation, this account surely 
appears problematic on its own terms, since Robert Alexy believes that the law 
is a unitary non-conflicting set of rules. Even when legal scholars appear to 
have accepted the special rules (lex posterior and lex specialis) as a knockdown 
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solution for reducing the discretion of the judge who is faced with incompatible 
norms and has to decide which to apply, the problem remain persistent. Just 
think of all the countless number of conflicting dispositions. What is needed to 
be introduced instead of post-positivist model of legal reasoning is a new semi-
otic account of reasoning in law, which starts with assumptions that legal mean-
ing is mediated through different semiotic devices used for construction of legal 
meaning. The aim is to provoke interest in an alternative way of approaching 
the issue of conflict in law that may avoid difficulties and disputes which con-
tinues to bedevil the splintered positivism with contradictory and incoherent 
views. 
Let us start with a quick summary of a new approach. The reader’s first reac-
tion would be, perhaps, how semiotics could contribute to the topic of legal 
reasoning. To assure that our reader will grasp the meaning we will try to con-
vey, we argue that is not difficult for a modern legal scholar to glimpse the af-
finity between semiotic modes of legal communication and the art of reasoning 
in theoretical jurisprudence. Thus, we should say that semiotics emphasizes the 
underlying communicative structure of all sign systems, such as law, which are 
dynamically evolving and are open-ended. In other words, to describe the mode 
of construction of meaning through semiotic devices in process of legal com-
munication is to describe a semiotic model of reasoning; and to make legal 
sense of the constructed meaning is to compare the situation in question with 
narrative typifications of action. The notion of ‘typification’ deserves a closer 
look: this notion is far from being the reserve of sociology, and it is used to 
address the concern of explaining the model of legal communication which is 
marked by shared typifications of habitualized situations, actions, and by actors 
who perform roles and observe norms associated with these typified roles and 
situations (Berger and Lukmann 1966). The same notion is also employed by 
Bernard S. Jackson in his influential Making Sense in Law; Jackson goes even 
further by arguing on the basis of Greimas’ semiotics that the pragmatic intelli-
gibility of a legal action is mediated through narrative typifications of legal 
behaviour, which are always accompanied with the transfer of modal value 
(Jackson 1995). Jackson refined the concept of a collective image (which is an 
approximation of factual situations) and developed it into the paradigm of narra-
tive typification: in assessing the plausibility of a particular narrative we make 
(within existing semiotic constraints of narrative grammar) comparisons with 
the typifications which are socially constructed, since the collective image al-
ways comes laden with a tacit social evaluation. Since there might be many 
ways in which justification contains important connections to evaluation, the 
model of ‘narrative typification’ is capable of generating judgments which are 
always relative to particular ‘semiotic group’ (Jackson 1995: 93–98). In short, 
what Greimas’ school does is to access the analaysis of legally relevant issues 
by using narrative typificiations: in other words, it subordinates the 
indetermined legal situation to defined pattern of typifications. The acceptance 
of Greimas-Jackson’s paradigm was a key methodological stance that guided 
many semiotic studies on legal reasoning. 
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Although there is also much common ground with Peircean semiotics of law 
in identifying semiotic features of conflicting interpretation, Greimas’ semiotics 
is less concerned with what we could be called pragmatic principle of reason-
ing: the meaning of conflicting interpretations consists in all of their 
conceivable future consequences which could conceivably occur if ever put to 
the test; that is our conception of these future conceptions is the whole of our 
conception of the object.11. In Greimas’ semiotics, we may observe different 
semiotic groups using different semiotic devices in producing particular dis-
courses, which later become accentuated in the process of legal communication. 
One obvious problem with the Greimas School’s reliance on a model of ‘semi-
otic groups’, is that it doesn’t explain what is happening in the case of conflict. 
The conflict produces alternative evaluative accentuation of legal problems 
unfolding thus the paradoxical structure of law: the particular accentuations of 
law have been un-accentuated by ideologically determined glance of attention 
during a distinguishable stage of legal reasoning. The notion of paradoxical 
structure envisioned by Peirce’s legal semiotics would require a further expla-
nation. While the obsession of Greimas’ semiotics with the fixed sign relation-
ships in legal discourse blocks the road of more abstract semiotic inquiry of 
paradox, Peirce’s semiotics opens the road to a new field of inquiry into ‘prag-
matics’ of the paradoxical structure as applied to the different systems of legal 
reasoning. The field of inquiry is henceforth open and usually the inquiry begins 
with the perception of an indeterminate legal situation by evaluating the contin-
gent, anomalous and extraordinary elements of sign systems in their mutual 
development. Thus, we are able to enhance empirical studies of conflicting in-
terpretations with Peirce’s concepts in such a way that we are able to open up a 
new understanding of legal reasoning and to grasp the implications of the new 
understanding for the analysis of practical issues of conflicts in law. 
In previous sections much has been said on the problem of conflict in juris-
prudence. While, each part described dimensions of conflict, the rudimentary 
problem is that the definition of conflict is usually taken for granted (a priori). 
The situation, seen from semiotic perspectives, looks very different: each such 
situation of legal indeterminacy calling for legal interpretation is that of a sign 
relationship between the defined (an established legal practice, a statue, a norm) 
and the vague (foreign) element: 
A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning which 
it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, 
                                                          
11  CP 5.402. Please note that we are following traditional abbreviations for citing Peirce's 
works. Abbreviation CP stands for The Collected Papers, Vols. I–VI ed. Charles Hartshorne 
and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–1935), Vols. VII–VIII ed. 
Arthur W. Burks (same publisher, 1958). In citation, CP 5.402 refers to Volume 5, paragraph 
402. (Sometimes this is followed by the year when Peirce wrote the text.). Another 
abbreviation EP stands The Essential Peirce: Volume 1 (1867–1893) and Volume 2 (1893–
1913), edited by the Peirce Edition Project and published by Indiana University Press (1992 
and 1998). 
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he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition. By in-
trinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence of any ignorance of 
the interpreter, but because the speaker’s habits of language were indeterminate 
(Peirce 1902: 748). 
We should however that this is not a new idea by any means: we have already 
encountered the model of paradox which is employed by Perelman’s new rheto-
ric as some kind of a rhetorical mode of interpretation (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1958). Before continuing with Peirce’s version of legal semiotics, we 
wish to emphasize that Perelman’s new rhetoric remains silent about the para-
doxical structure of legal reasoning. Further, it seems to be more than a coinci-
dence that in Peirce’s semiotics the analysis of legal reasoning is related to the 
semiotic problem of determining the indeterminate, i.e. that sign of the relation-
ship of vague with definite which indicates the process of growth of ideas. An-
glo-American jurisprudence provides a revealing and colourful illustration of 
this point: a remarkable feature of Common Law is that it has abilities to trans-
form and to grow on its grounds, to interpret the law where it is vague and even 
to establish new rules. In open legal systems, it is the component of vagueness 
or that which is seen as new and not yet classified as a general idea/sign, not 
yet named and thus symbolized, which confronts inquirers with a phenomenon 
of a paradoxical nature (law as a system of contradictions). According to semi-
otic conjecture, the concept of paradox as an intrinsic structure of thought is 
closely related to problems of conflict, contradiction, incompatibility, and re-
pugnance in law (‘repugnancy’ is used here in the same sense it was used in 
Bentham’s works (Bentham 1907), i.e., when law is the repugnant to other indi-
viduals’ rights). One needs not contest this particular point, since the semiotic 
methodology is indispensable here, for it provides a captivating model for the 
analysis of conflict not only within similar systems and between two distinct 
systems of discourse and practice as well. This concept of conflict as systematic 
tension has far-reaching methodological implications, for instance in emergent 
law of European Union (Robertson 2010). 
To make this point even more comprehensible, we should recall that alt-
hough Charles Sanders Peirce was able to work a solid foundation which would 
later be applicable to more complex semiotic account of law, he had discussed 
legal concepts only on few occasions to illustrate some of his ideas. The unde-
veloped project of legal semiotics anticipated by Peirce was later resurrected by 
Roberta Kevelson; Peircean insights transpire through Kevelson’s provocative 
body of work, in which she developed her original theory of legal semiotics. It 
is interesting to note that Kevelson saw her own ideas as being in some kind of 
hermeneutic dialogue with the texts of Peirce, whose meaning she helped to 
complete and translate (albeit in a speculative manner) into the elements of a 
coherent semiotic theory. In producing a speculative grammar of legal semiotics 
that transcended the works of her predecessors, Kevelson managed to integrate 
highly suggestive semiotic works of Peirce into the realm of legal theory. 
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The dialogue between Kevelson and Peirce’s texts led to the emergence of 
what is known as Kevelsonian legal semiotics or semiotics of legal argument, 
which generates a new method of legal inquiry unifying science and phenome-
nology, since it centres on the pragmatic structure of legal inquiry. The modern 
synthesis of Peirce’s semiotics and social sciences was only just getting under-
way, when Kevelson published her first paper about the relationships between 
law and human sciences (Kevelson 1992). Law is a practical institution, which 
becomes through its practicality an affirmation of the values of the social prac-
tice. On the other hand, like phenomenologists and Mukařovsky, Kevelson lik-
ened law to an aesthetic object of human invention, which may be investigated 
for new innovative knowledge, if it meets the basic criteria for any sign, any 
idea of thought or system of thoughts in a pragmatic praxis: it must produce 
meaning and it must leave its accentuated mark. Yet, amidst rising expectations 
of legal semiotics, we should notice that its image of legal innovations is radi-
cally different from that one endorsed by legal positivism. From positivist per-
spective, the law is able to appreciate innovation only after it becomes a matter 
of habitual convention, while semiotic perspective presumes distinctive attitude 
to the nature of innovation: to produce an innovative legal text is to break away 
from conventions and rules and to express creative freedom and imagination. 
Here, the differences between traditional legal studies and semiotics with re-
spect to objects of inquiry are particularly suggestive of the nature of semiotic 
discourse. Legal studies use the known properties of legal signs to investigate 
the structure of the law, whereas semiotics uses the known structure of law as a 
starting point for investigating the structure of law. 
In the context of Kevelson’s legal semiotics, the bridge between the semiotic 
model of legal inquiry and Conflict of Laws becomes apparent. A special corol-
lary of this statement is exemplified by the concept of ‘moral conflict’ that con-
siders legal reasoning not only as a process of proceeding from the principles 
and rules held by conscience to the solution of particular legal cases, but also as 
a process of justification of the legal decision taken before the conscience of the 
judge and of the sovereign (society). In the cases of moral conflict between 
judges’ conscience and conscience of sovereign, the model of ‘moral conflict’ 
offers a mechanism which allows judges to reconcile their conscience and con-
science of sovereign, expressed in legal rules. It is exactly at that point where 
these two frames of reference (judges’ conscience and conscience of sovereign) 
come together, one universe of discourse is being brought into a relation of su-
perimposition upon another and the traditional law of identity and contradiction 
become irrelevant. In adherence to this semiotic principle of ‘crossing bridge’, 
there is no significant difference between semiotic concept of tension and Con-
flict of Laws. In this perspective, we may regard Conflict of Laws as a claim 
made by legal actors, individuals and organizations. Implicit here is the concept 
of claim which involves reference to two or more distinctly different generally 
acknowledged and usually observed legal rules, procedures or practices within 
the one legal systems: in modern open innovative legal system there is no single 
type of interpretation that could claim universal validity of its assumptions, 
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representing, let say, the grandstand view on how legal contracts should be 
translated (Kevelson 1991: 44–45). To add here external dimensions of this 
paradox in Conflict of Laws which fall under the scope of relationships between 
local legislation and private international law? As we show below, Kevelson’s 
stance is interesting because of its immediate implications in the process of 
‘law-finding’. Thus, semiotics affords at least one approach that unfolds in lo-
cus operandi of international law and Conflict of Laws. 
The process of international law-finding requires from international lawyers 
to examine whether the generality of national jurisdictions evinces attitudes, 
which are congruent to the provisions of international customary law: in reality 
this process is simply amenable to a search and analysis of an opinio generalis 
juris generalis, which is shared among States (Hutchinson 1996: 46). From a 
semiotic point of view, we may also conclude that a legal interpretation can be 
said to represent a particular semiotic process (token) most appropriate to it. 
From this viewpoint, the notion of interpretation as “it affects or relates to legal 
hermeneutics, is brought to a point of view which necessarily stands in opposi-
tion to hermeneutic principle which holds that ‘In claris nonfit interpretatio’, or 
‘when the text is clear there is no room for interpretation’” (Kevelson 1986: 
363). Considering the aspect of legal competence, the pragmatic concept of 
interpretation accentuates the famous interpretative principle of clara non sunt 
interpretanda, i.e., only if clarity of the legal text is doubtful do judges have 
permission to interpret. 
In effort to understand the patterns of legal reasoning and to enrich the semi-
otic approach with legal hermeneutics, we can point to striking analogies with 
so called derivational theory of interpretation (based on the meaning of a word 
derived from a particular linguistic context). As Kevelson’s long passage above 
suggests, legal reasoning has to deal with universal hermeneutic problems: not 
only laws and norms, but also rules for interpretation in legal systems must 
themselves be subject to re-interpretation. Here, interpretation is coming to be 
viewed as means of expanding, reordering and even reinventing the rules. Tak-
en from that perspective, legal semiotics permits the dominant principle of clara 
non sunt interpretanda in judicial justification to be overridden by another in-
terpretative canon of omnia sunt interpretanda (Zirk-Sadowski 2011: 4). What 
we have here is a brilliant characteristic of the dilemma faced by the traditional 
approach of modern courts that regards the legislative categories as closed cate-
gories. Regardless of meaning attached to these categories by legal actors, the 
legislative categories can be interpreted and reinterpreted but not reworked or 
extended. However, it is hard to fail to notice that this traditional approach does 
not work in those cases, where a statute represents a general or vague judgment 
and where there is a conflict between rules for interpretation in the system of 
law which prevails. In these cases, the process of interpretation constitutes “a 
more abstract process of discovery, which in turn, takes its cues from the world 
of experience and observation and forms its hypotheses as abstracted from the 
actual, practical world” (Kevelson 1985: 126). However, if the rules of interpre-
tation and those ones of discovery are said to be a part of any given system of 
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law which they govern, then it must be conceded that the system of law, as a 
whole, is unstable and that this instability is desirable. On the other hand, if we 
understand that signs of law are omnipresent in social discourses, then we must 
accept that those signs are created by social actors in different legal contexts. 
Indeed, the realm of practical jurisprudence judges may be intentionally duplic-
itous in exercising their vast power, because “their use of linguistic argument as 
justification is by no means consistent, and is frequently inconsistent and idio-
syncratic” (Solan 1993: 1). In this respect, we can recapitulate Lotman’s treat-
ment of semiotic models: each element of a model and the model as whole are 
simultaneously parts of more than one system, while acquiring their own dis-
tinctive meaning (Lotman 1977). 
Actually, this is exactly what was implied by Peirce’s account of interpreta-
tion: the traditional laws of thought are inadequate to describe the actual process 
of evolving ideas, and a new brand type of logic needs to be constructed which, 
at the same time, sustains paradox and accounts for contradiction and which 
doesn’t not attempt to impose reductive solutions. As has been repeatedly 
demonstrated by Kevelson, this new type of logic is logic of questions and an-
swers or an erotetic logic to which deontic logic is subordinate and derived 
(Kevelson 1981). From the point of view of semiotics we might say that this 
new type of logic underlies its novelty with respect to functions of ‘pure rheto-
ric’, which strives to ascertain the laws by which one thought brings forth an-
other. In other words, erotetic logic of dialogism presupposes direct conversa-
tional dialogue “in a process of reasoning which attempts to account for the 
method by which new information is discovered, processed and integrated, into 
continually evolving, open-ended system of reasoning, which parallels the 
method of creating human discourse” (Kevelson 1982: 161). The dialogism is a 
means of dividing an argument into a number of concurring arguments, each of 
which has only one premise but two alternative conclusions/interpretations/ 
consequences, and these arguments may be evolved infinitely until one finds 
satisfactory solutions. 
The view of the late Peirce on the essence of interpretation was epitomized 
by his famous statement:  
What does it mean to speak of ‘the interpretation of a sign?’ A sign is complete 
only then when it is explained (CP 2.230), translated (CP 5.594, for instance), in-
terpreted (CP 5.569). Interpretation is merely another word for translation (EP2: 
388).  
Since the meaning of the sign is the translation of the sign into another system 
of signs, the meaning of a sign is the sign into which it has to be translated. 
What we want to emphasize here is that signs interpret their referent signs and 
an Interpretant (understood as an effect actually produced by a sign upon an 
interpreter of it) acts as a translator whose function is to bring together different 
sign systems by establishing an equivalent meaning between representations of 
the same idea /concept in those different sign systems. It is obvious that Peirce’s 
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phenomenology is nothing else as a preliminary stage to the semiotic inquiry 
methodologically corresponding to discovery in law. The semiotic process of 
discovery in law attempts to conceptualize a means of bringing together legal 
and non-legal discourses by proposing semiotic account of interpretation. Yet, 
the assumption seems to challenge the traditional positivist position, according 
to which legal interpretation is a strictly semiotic process: in a positivist theory 
of law, the meaning of legal texts is conceived as being transmitted from sender 
to recipients. For legal positivist, it seems natural to consider the central task of 
legal reasoning to be the uncovering of legal meaning included in messages 
communicated in legal discourses. When the discussed theoretical method 
comes in confluence with juridical realities, we might say that law is created 
twice by its author and addressee. This is how this semiotic sentiment is ex-
pressed in Witteveen’s account of legal communication: according to Wittev-
een, ‘symbolic law’ is communicated through series of circular movements 
between the addressee (citizen) and the author (legislator) (Witteveen 1999). 
Taking this model of legal communication seriously, we might come to an 
astonishing solution of conflict: many duly enacted laws do not come to mean 
very much for most of their intended audience when those the law addresses on 
paper have no need or no incentive to make it part of their actual considerations. 
From this point of view, semiotics as a whole is concerned with how one 
level may be translated into a different level or method of inquiry. Thus, in or-
der to illustrate semiotics models of reasoning we could regard the idea of inter-
pretation in Peirce’s semiotics as being parallel to an interpretation in legal the-
ory. Below we’ll offer Peirce’s account of interpretation, overall model of 
which was discussed in a milestone paper by Max H. Fish (Fisch 1942). To 
clarify the basic concepts, we ought to truncate the complex aspects of Peirce’s 
account to the level of a simple pattern we call ‘pragmatic interpretation’. 
Peirce’s basic thesis was that general concepts get their meanings not from their 
antecedents in sensation, as traditional empiricism had it, but from their practi-
cal consequences in action; all judgments lead to consequent acts and what we 
know to be true, we know because of the effects of their acts upon us. The con-
cept of meaning as the sum of possible practical consequences and effects of 
human actions is crystallized in Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: 
 
In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should 
consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from 
the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute 
the entire meaning of the conception. (CP 5.9) 
 
Peirce’s conception of clarity contains the idea that in order to define the mean-
ing of words we have to test them. In other words, we know what these acts 
mean to us by interpreting them, by inferring meaning in a manner with regard 
to the thing in question until we have settled doubts and achieve some sense of 
certainty, which we hold and use as true. The very similar idea is expressed in 
Holmes’ instrumental approach to the theoretical discourse of law. This ap-
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proach has come to be enshrined in the jurisprudence history as ‘the prediction 
theory’: ‘law’ is seen as the set of predictions of judges’ decisions. As it has 
been shown by Max Fish, Holmes’ ‘prediction theory’ was directly influenced 
by Peirce’s account of pragmatic interpretation. Holmes was very explicit in his 
refutation of some of the earliest formulations of interpretation rules which ap-
peared in the nineteenth century. It is the merit of Common Law that it firstly 
decides the facts of case and only afterwards determines the principles: the 
cases are decided as questions of normative law; the principles are articulated 
on the basis of a number of individual cases. 
In conclusion, we have to admit that our discussion of different perspectives 
on the concept of ‘conflict’ in legal discourses comes down to outlining the 
methodological reversals in Conflict of Laws, phenomenology, hermeneutics, 
deconstructionism, and semiotics. If we would accept this claim, then we could 
say that Conflict of Laws was born from the reversal of the priority of under-
standing over practical actions. It is given this presupposition that Conflict of 
Laws comes to stand on its own as something distinct and formalist. Here, we 
are taking the term ‘formalist’ in its strict sense: it is understood as adherence to 
a norm’s prescription without regard to background substantive reasons. By 
virtue of this reversal, Conflict of Laws moves away from a communicational 
model of law towards the doctrine of normative evaluations, wherein formal 
conditions of validity take priority over substantive reasons. This methodologi-
cal reversal might be one reason why the doctrine of Conflict of Laws was nev-
er able to develop theoretical generalization of its basic concept ‘conflict’. It 
also seems plausible to suppose that phenomenology of conflict assuredly does 
stem from another methodological reversal, the one which gives the priority to 
essentialist observation of human actions over hermeneutic doctrine of literal 
meaning and semiotic representations of these actions. The problem of conflict 
for phenomenology is that of a clear distance between two conflicting subjec-
tive viewpoints, since classical phenomenology posits that we can only perceive 
things through our subjective relationships to these things. Therefore, the phe-
nomenological potential of dealing with ‘conflict’ is very limited. Hermeneutics 
(including phenomenological hermeneutics) is accompanied by the methodolog-
ical reversal of understanding over explanation: it extends the subjective tradi-
tion of phenomenology even further by incorporating the concept of interper-
sonal communication. What comes to its subject-matter, then we must admit 
that hermeneutics from the beginning of the 20th century has deliberated upon 
the perennial absence of meaning, the fusion of subjective horizons, and the 
unconscious. The biggest problem with the project of deconstruction is that 
since each person is being bound to his own subjective view, there is no method 
of discovering objective truth in conflict situations and communication becomes 
helpless. To be honest, although legal hermeneutics stipulates a quasi-necessary 
and explicit order of priority for different hermeneutic methods, it seems that at 
least some aspects of this order look very problematic in the context of practical 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, the infinite drift of meaning proclaimed by the 
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members of deconstructionist project brings forth certain problems in its appli-
cations to the analysis of legal reasoning. 
Thus being said, we have adopted a more or less defensive stance in favour 
of legal semiotics: what is at issue is the defence of semiotic approaches in the 
face of aforementioned problems of practical jurisprudence with which they do 




Alexy, Robert (1989). A theory of legal argumentation. The theory of rational discourse 
as theory of legal justification. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Alexy, Robert (2003). On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio 
Juris 16: 433–449. 
Atiyah, Patrick S. (1979). The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Balkin, Jay M. (1987). Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory. The Yale Law Jour-
nal 96(4):743–786. 
Bentham, Jeremy (1907). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Berger, Peter L., Thomas Luckmann (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books. 
Betti, Emilio (1995). Teoria generate della interpretazione. Milan. 
Brilmayer, Lea (1995). Conflict of Laws. 2nd ed. Boston: Little Brown. 
Collier, John G. (1987). Conflict of Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Coskun, Deniz (2007). Law as Symbolic Form: Ernst Cassirer and the Anthropocentric 
View of Law. Dordrecht: Springer. 
de Man, Paul (1986). Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Derrida, Jacques (1978). Writing and Difference. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Derrida, Jacques (1982). Margins of Philosophy. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Dilthey, Wilhelm (1996). Hermeneutics and the Study of History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Dworkin, Ronald (1978). Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth. 
Eco, Umberto (1990). The Limits of Interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
Fisch, Max F. (1942). Justice Holmes, the Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragmatism. 
Journal of Philosophy 39: 85–97. 
Fleerackers, Frank (2008). The Role of Lawyers in Interaction: Mediation, ADR and 
Legal Thniking. In: Association of International Arbitration (ed.). The New EU Di-
rective on Mediation: First Insights. Antwerpen: Maklu, 25–34. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975). Truth and Method. New York: The Seabury Press. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1992). Interview: Writing and the living voice. In: Misgeld, D., 
Nicholson, Gr. (eds.). Hans-Georg Gadamer on education, poetry and history. New 
York: State University of New York Press, 63–71. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1993). Hermeneutik, Ästhetik, Praktische Philosophie: Hans-
Georg Gadamer im Gespräch. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter. 
Geeroms, Sophie (2004). Foreign law in civil litigation: a comparative and functional 
analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Geninasca, Jacques (1997). La parole littéraire. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. 
Gény, Francois (1963). Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law. 
2d ed. St. Paul: West Publishing. 
Gilmore, Grant (1974). The Death of Contract. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Goodrich, Peeter (1990). Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic 
Masks. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
57 
Goodrich, Peeter (1996). Law in the Courts of Love: Literature and Other Minor Juris-
prudences. London: Routledge. 
Goulding, Martin Ph. (2001). Legal reasoning. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. 
Gräzin, Igor (1997). The Rule of Law: But of Which Law? Natural Law and Positive 
Law in Post-Communist Transformations. The John Marshall Law Review. 26(3): 
719–737. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1988). Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hart, Herbert L. A. (1961). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hassemer, Winfried (1968). Tatbestand und Typus. Untersuchungen zur strafrechtli-
chen Hermeneutik. Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München: C. Heimanns. 
Hassemer, Winfried (1986). Juristische Hermeneutik. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphi-
losophie 72: 195–212. 
Heidegger, Martin (1962). Being and Time. New York: Harper.  
Husserl, Edmund (1975). Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur rei-
nen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 
Husserl, Gerhardt (1964). Recht und Welt: rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen. Juristi-
sche Abhandlungen. Bd 1. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. 
Hutchings, Peter J. (1999). Interpreting the Rule of Law. International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law 13: 445–461. 
Hutchinson, David (1996). Positivism and International Law. In: Guest, St. (ed.), Posi-
tivism Today. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 46–64. 
Iser, Wolfgang (2000). The Range of Interpretation. New York:Columbia University 
Press. 
Jackson, Bernard S. (1985). Semiotics and Legal Theory. New York: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Jackson, Bernard S. (1990). On Scholarly Developments in Legal Semiotic. Ratio Juris. 
3: 415–424. 
Jackson, Bernard S. (1995). Making Sense in Law. Linguistic, Psychological and Semi-
otic Perspectives. Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications. 
Jakobson, Roman (1987). Linguistic and Poetics. In: Pomorska, K., and Rudy, S. (eds). 
Language in Literature. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 62–94. 
Jenks, Winfried (1953). The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties. British Yearbook of 
International Law 30: 401–453. 
Kathy, Eden (2005). Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the 
Ancient Legacy and Its Humanist Reception. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press. 
Kegel, Gerhard (1979). Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws 
and the American Reformers. American Journal of Comparitive Law 27: 615–633. 
Kelsen, Hans (1967). Pure Theory of Law. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kevelson, Roberta (1977). Reversals and Recognitions: Peirce and Mukařovský on the 
Art of Conversation. Semiotica 19(3/4): 281–320. 
Kevelson, Roberta (1981). Semiotics and Structures of Law. Semiotica 31(1/2): 183–
192. 
Kevelson, Roberta (1982). Peirce’s Dialogism, Continuous Predicate, and Legal Rea-
soning. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18(2): 159–176. 
Kevelson, Roberta (1985). Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs and Legal Hermeneutics. In: 
Bulygin, E. et al (eds.).Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life. Dordrecht: Reidel, 
125–135. 
58 
Kevelson, Roberta (1986). Semiotic Method and Legal Inquiry. Indiana Law Review 
61(3): 355–371. 
Kevelson, Roberta (1991). Peirce, Paradox, Praxis: The Image, the Conflict, and the 
Law. Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter. 
Kevelson, Roberta (1992). Law and the human sciences. Fifth Round Table on Law and 
Semiotics. New York: P. Lang. 
Kevelson, Roberta (1997). Law at the border. In: Rauch, I., Carr, G. E (eds.). Semiotics 
around the World: Synthesis in Diversity. Proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the 
International Association for Semiotic Studies, Berkeley, 1994, vol.2. Berlin-New 
York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1143–1146. 
Knop, Karen, Ralf Michaels, and Annelise Riles (2008). Foreword: Transdisciplinary 
Conflict of Laws. Law and Contemporary Problems 71(3): 1–17. 
Lando, Ole, Hugh G. Beale (eds.) (2000). Principles of European Contract Law. Parts I 
and II. Dordrecht:Kluwer Law International. 
Leyh, Gregory (1992). Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Lévinas, Emmanuel (1982). L’Au-delà du verset. Lectures et discours talmudiques. 
Paris: Minuit. 
Lieber, Francis (1880). Legal and Political Hermeneutics: Principles of Interpretation 
and Construction in Law and Politics. 3d. ed. St. Louis: F. H. Thomas. 
Lotman, Juri, Boris Uspensky (1984). Semiotics of Russian Culture. Michigan Slavic 
Contributions. Michigan: Ann Arbor, 125–140. 
Lotman, Juri (1977). The dynamic model of a semiotic system. Semiotica 21(3/4): 193–
210. 
Lotman, Juri (1990). Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture. (translated by 
Ann Shukman). London-New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois1988. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Minneapolis: Universi-
ty of Minnesota Press. 
MacCormick, Neil (1983).Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Rediscovery of Practi-
cal Reason. Journal of Law and Society 19: 1–15. 
MacCormick, Neil (2007). Institutions of Law: An Thesis in Legal Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Marmor, Andrei (1996). Interpretation and Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Marmor, Andrei (2001). Postive Law and Objective Values. Oxford University: Claren-
don Press. 
Milovanovic, Dragan (1992). Postmodern Law and Disorder. Psychoanalytic Jurispru-
dence, Chaos and Juridic Exegeses. Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications. 
Müller, Friedrich (1977). Rechtsstaatliche Methodik und politische Rechtstheorie. 
Rechtstheorie 8: 73–92. 
Necati, Polat (1997). The Law and its Readings: Realism, Verifiability, and the Rule of 
Law. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémi-
otique Juridique 10(30): 293–316. 
Nerhot, Patrick 1993. Law, Writing, Meaning: A Thesis In Legal Hermeneutics. Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh Press. 
Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods. UnitedNations Document A/CONF.97/19; United Nations Sales 
Publication No. E.81.IV.3. (Text of the Convention also reprinted in UNCITRAL 
Yearbook (1980), Vol. XI, part three, I (United Nations Sales Publication No. 
E.81.V.8)). 
59 
Pasquier, duc de, Etienne-Denis (1847). L'Interprétation des Institutes de Justinian: 
avec la Conférence de Chasque Paragraphe aux ordonnances royaux, Arrestz de 
Parlement et Coustumes Générales de la France. Videcoq Ainé: Durand. 
Peczenik, Aleksander (1996). Jumps and Logic in the Law. Artificial Intelligence and 
Law 4(3/4): 297–329. 
Peirce, Charles S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, 1931–1935, 
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds., vols. 7–8, 1958, Arthur W. Burks, ed. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Cited as CP). 
Peirce, Charles S. The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings. Vol. 1 (1867–
1893), Nathan Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel, eds. Bloomington and Indianapo-
lis: Indiana University Press. 
Peirce, Charles S. (1902). Vague. In: Baldwin, J. M. (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology. New York: Macmillan. 
Perelman, Chaim and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). Traité de l’argumentation: La 
nouvelle rhétorique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Perelman, Chaim (1965). Les antinomies en droit. Essai de synthèse. In: Perelman, Ch. 
(ed), Les Antinomies en droit. Brussels: Bruylant, 392–404. 
Perelman, Chaim (1980). Justice, Law, and Argument: Thesiss on Moral and Legal 
Reasoning. Boston: Reidel. 
Poggi, Francesca (2011). Law and Conversational Implicatures. International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law/ Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique. 23(1): 21–
40. 
Raz, Joseph (1979). The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Raz, Joseph (1996). Why Interpret? Ratio Juris 9: 349–63. 
Raz, Joseph (2007).The Argument from Injustice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Posi-
tivism. In: Pavlakos, G. (ed.), Law, Rights and Discourse. The Legal Philosophy of 
Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 34–35. 
Reinach, Adolf (1983). The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law. Aletheia 3: 1–142. 
Ricoeur, Paul (1973). The Task of Hermeneutics. Philosophy Today 17(2/4): 112–128. 
Ricoeur, Paul (1974). The Conflict of Interpretations. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press. 
Robertson, Collin (2010). EU Law and Semiotics. International Journal for the Semiot-
ics of Law 23(2): 145–164. 
Ross, Alf (1958). On Law and Justice. London: Steven. 
Savigny, Friedrich Karl von (1951). Juristische Methodenlehre, nach der Ausarbeitung 
des Jakob Grimm. Stuttgart: Koehler. 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich D. E. (1986). General Theory and Art of Interpretation. In: 
Müller-Vollmer, K. (ed.), The Hermeneutics Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 72–
97. 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich D. E.(1998). Hermeneutics and Criticism, and Other Writ-
ings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Searle, John (1979). Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. 
New York, Cambridge University: Press. 
Senden, Hanneke (2011). Interpretation of fundamental rights in a multilevel legal 
system: An analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. Cambridge, U.K: Intersentia. 
Sharankova, Jelena (2000). The Principle of Universalizability and its Semiosis. Inter-
national Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Ju-
ridique 13(1): 29–64. 
60 
Smith, Sidney K. (2012). Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Policy: Time for Con-
gressional Intervention? Texas Law Review 90: 743–770. 
Solan, Lawrence M. (1993). The language of judges. Chicago and London: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press. 
Tapani, Jussi (2009). The Quagmire of Impossible Attempts – How to distinguish be-
tween Punishable and Non-Punishable Cases of Criminal Attempt. In: Wahlgren,P. 
(ed.): Scandinavian Studies in Law. Volume 54. Criminal Law. Stockholm: Stock-
holm Institute for Scandinavian Law, 132–148. 
Thibaut, Anton Friedrich Justus, Alexander August von Buchholtz (1846). System des 
Pandekten-Rechts. 9. Ausg. Band 1–2, Jena: Druck und Verlag von Friedrich Mauke. 
Travaux preparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights (1985). Dor-
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Wilensky, Robert (1989). Primal content and actual content: An antidote to literal 
meaning. Berkley: University of California. 
Witteveen, Willem J. (1999). Significant, Symbolic, and Symphonic Laws: Communi-
cation Through Legislation. In: van Schooten, H. (ed.), Semiotics and Legislation: 
Jurisprudential, Institutional and Sociological Perspectives. Liverpool: Deborah 
Charles Publications, 27–70. 
Zirk-Sadowski. Marek (2011). Interpretation of Law and Judges Communities. Interna-




SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Juriidilise argumentatsiooni semiootilised mudelid 
Käesolev dissertatsioon kujutab endast katset käsitleda kaasaegset juriidilise 
tõlgendamise teooriat võrdleva kriitilise meetodi abil. Selle projekti käigus ole-
me analüüsinud erinevaid juriidilise argumentatsiooni teooriaid; neid teooriad 
kõrvutades oleme püüdnud välja selgitada, kas teoreetiline diskursus tänapäeva-
ses õigussemiootikas loob piisavad eeldused selleks, et visandada teoreetiline 
raamistik, mis aitaks kaasa juriidilise argumentatsiooni semiootilise teooria 
loomisele. Huvi juriidilise semiootika (ehk õigussemiootika) vastu tulenes pea-
miselt sügavast rahulolematusest olukorraga kaasaegses teoreetilises jurispru-
dentsis (eriti selles osas, mis on otseselt seotud juriidilise argumentatsiooni 
probleemistikuga). Ajalooliselt on välja kujunenud nii, et ‘traditsiooniline’ ju-
risprudents (jurisprudents selle sõna kõige laiemas mõttes) toetab õigussüsteemi 
ühtsuse mudelit, mis enamjaolt ei kirjelda, kuidas reaalses juriidilises diskursu-
ses toimub diskursuses osalejate omavaheline juriidiliste hoiakute vaheline 
kommunikatsioon. Just juriidilise kommunikatsiooni semiootilise tegevusena 
esitamine oli selleks lähtepunktiks, mis andis meile tähtsaima põhjuse kahelda 
selles, et seadust võib adekvaatselt kirjeldada ja määratleda ainult traditsiooni-
liste õigusmõistete kaudu. Sellest lähtuvalt võib kindlalt väita, et juriidilise se-
miootika suurimaks eeliseks ongi see, et juriidiline semiootika püüab eliminee-
rida eksitavaid ettekujutusi õiguse tõlgendamisest ning asendab need alterna-
tiivse käsitlusega, mis laiemas perspektiivis tundub olevat märksa viljakam.  
Käesoleva dissertatsiooni eesmärgiks on analüüsida juriidilise tõlgendamise 
olemust semiootilisest vaatenurgast. Juriidilise argumentatsiooni ehk õigusliku 
tõlgendamise analüüsi käigus on püütud astuda mõned sammud loodetava õigu-
se tõlgendamise teooriate sünteesi poole. Nagu teada, on tõlgendamise pea-
miseks eesmärgiks välja selgitada seaduse mõte (lad. ratio legis) ehk teha kind-
laks tõlgendatavas sättes väljendatud reegli, põhimõtte või mõiste sisu. Seega 
kujutab kohtumõistmine endast loovat, õigust edasi arendavat tegevust, ja sel-
lest lähtuvalt on käesolevas dissertatsioonis pandud põhirõhk just seaduse ra-
kendamisele ehk kohtupidamise käigus toimuvale tõlgendamisele. Taoline rõhu-
asetus on täiesti arusaadav: iga seadus peab toimima, kuid see juhtub ainult siis, 
kui seaduse rakendamisel saadakse seadusest mõistuspäraselt aru. Kesksel kohal 
on siinses esituses erinevate tõlgendamiste konflikti mõiste, mida olen teoreeti-
lises plaanis väljendanud mõistega tension (pinge): semiootilisest vaatevinklist 
on kõige olulisem spetsiifilist juriidilist tähendust loov mehhanism, mis reali-
seerub erinevate tõlgenduslike lähenemiste ja meetodite tulemusena. Olenemata 
rõhuasetustest saab viiteid sellele käsitlusele nii otseselt kui kaudselt tuletada 
väitekirjas analüüsitud kohtupraktikast. Kokkuvõttes võib isegi öelda, et uus  
semiootiline mudel aitab meie arvates jõuda antud uurimuse eesmärgini ehk 
aitab luua uut raamistikku õigusaktide ja seaduste tõlgendamise mehhanismide 
mõistmiseks.  
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Kõrvuti analüüsiga õiguse tõlgendamise olemusest võime dissertatsiooni 
eesmärgid lühidalt sõnastada järgmiselt: 
 arendada kontseptuaalne raamistik juriidilise argumentatsiooni erinevatel 
etappidel tekkivate probleemide käsitlemiseks. 
 arutleda küsimuste üle, mis ilmnevad seoses juriidilise argumentatsiooni 
üldlevinud meetodite mittetäieliku ühilduvusega pakutud semiootilise mude-
liga. 
 vaadelda, kuidas ühendada omavahel erinevaid õiguse tõlgendamise teoo-
riaid ja semiootilist meetodit praktikas. 
 
Käesoleva dissertatsiooni peamised tulemused ja järeldused on järgmised: 
 dissertatsiooni raames on juhitud argumenteeritult tähelepanu mitmete jurii-
diliste argumentatsiooni teooriate puudustele. Nagu dissertatsioonis on kriiti-
lisest vaatavinklist näidatud, tuleb seletada teooriate puudulikuse põhjusi 
semiootilises võtmes.  
 kuigi õigusteadlase ja õigussemiootiku perspektiivid juriidilise argumne-
tatsiooni võivad näida kokkusobimatud, on nad siiski komplementaarsed 
ning toovad esile ühise vaatepunkti. 
 juriidilise argumentatsiooni semiootilise analüüsi aluseks on Peirce’i se-
miootika/Pariisi koolkonna semiootika mõistete abil loodud teoreetiline raa-
mistik. Dissertatsioonis on erialase kirjanduse põhjal välja toodud peamised 
pidepunktid, mis on vajalikud uue teoreetilise raamistiku väljaarendamiseks. 
 dissertatsiooni raames loodud teoreetiline raamistik on uudne. Teoreertilise 
raamistiku uudsus väljendub selles, et uurimuse käigus on seostatud klassi-
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